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IN MEMORIAM
On June 4, 2014 RCMP Constable Douglas Larche, Constable David Ross, and Constable 
Fabrice Gevaudan were  shot and killed by a  heavily armed subject in Moncton, New 
Brunswick. Two other RCMP constables were wounded. The subject was apprehended 30 
hour later following a massive manhunt in which a large part of Moncton was shutdown.
Constable	 Douglas	 Larche was 40-years-old and had served with the RCMP for 12 years. 
Constable	 David	 Ross was 32-years-old and had served with the RCMP for seven years.
Constable	 Fabrice	 Gevaudan was 45-years-old and had served with the RCMP for six years. 
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Cst. Douglas Larche Cst. Fabrice Gevaudan Cst. David Ross
On May 7, 2014 50-year old Thunder Bay Police Service 
Constable 	 Joseph	 Prevett suffered a fatal heart attack 
while participating  in a joint training  exercise  with the 
Ontario Provincial Police. He and his K9 partner, Timber, 
were navigating  a course when he suddenly collapsed. He 
was transported to a local hospital where he passed away. 
Constable Prevett had served in law enforcement for 16  years 
and is survived by his wife and family.
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
Volume 14 Issue 3 - May/June 2014
PAGE 2
National	 Library	 of	 Canada	 
Cataloguing	 in	 Publication	 
Data
Main entry under title:
In service: 10-8. -- Vol. 1, no. 1 (June 2001)  
 Monthly
 Title from caption.
 “A newsletter devoted to operational police 
officers across British Columbia.”
       ISSN 1705-5717 = In service, 10-8
1. Police - British Columbia - Periodicals. 2. 
Police - Legal status, laws, etc. - Canada - 
Cases - Periodicals. I. Justice Institute of 
British Columbia. Police Academy. II. Title: In 
service, 10-8. III. Title: In service, ten-eight.
Highlights In This Issue
Disturbance Requires More Than Yelling At Police 5
Reasonable Grounds Need Only Be Rationally 
Supported
8
Crown Not Required To Detail Every Minute Of 
Delay
10
Totality Of Circumstances Considered In Arrest 
Analysis
14
At Point Of Detention Officer Had Reasonable 
Suspicion: No s. 9 Breach
15
Nothing More Than ‘Warn’ Required For Immediate 
Roadside Prohibition
19
Witness Report Of Impaired Driving Did Not Alter 
s. 10(b) Delay
21
Accused Must Prove Rights Breached Under s. 10(b) 
Charter
23
Inferred Joint Possession Justifies Arrest & Search 25
Warrantless Full Download of Smartphone 
Unreasonable
27
Admission Of Drinking Provides Grounds For ASD 32
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Upcoming Events
Human	 Source	 Management
This course will equip participants with the basic skills 
required and the best practices to follow associated 
with the recruitment and handling  of informants and 
agents . I t includes preparat ion of judicial 
authorizations utilizing informant / agent information, 
policy and how to effectively report on information 
derived from these assets. 
September	 16-19,	 2014
JIBC	 Police	 Academy	 Advanced	 Training
www.jibc.ca/course/POLADV715 
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
BCACP/CACP
2015	 Police	 Leadership	 Conference
April	 12-14,	 2015
“Leading	 with	 Vision	 and	 Values”
This is Canada's largest police leadership 
conference providing  an opportunity for delegates 
to hear leadership  topics discussed by world-
renowned speakers. Click here
see 
page  
40
BCLEDN	 Conference
November	 5,	 2014
“Radicalization	 of	 Terrorists”	 
see 
page 
24
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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice  Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The active reader:  strategies for academic 
reading and writing.
Eric Henderson.
Don Mills, ON: OUP Canada, 2011, c2012.
PE 1408 H385 2012
Aggression [videorecording].
VEA
Burnaby, BC: Distribution Access [distributor], 
c2013.
1 videodisc (22 min.) : sd., col. ; 4 3/4 in. (DVD)
Are all people capable of murder? What drives 
people to violence?  Can TV affect our actions and 
even influence us to acts of violence? This  
interview-led documentary  style program examines 
aggressive  media, aggressive behaviour and the 
banality of evil with the  support of original film 
footage of research and actual crimes. This program 
features research psychologis ts providing 
explanations and reasoning behind aggression.
BF 575 A3 A34 2013 D1841
Doing qualitative research.
David Silverman.
London, UK; Thousand Oaks, CA; New Delhi; 
Singapore: SAGE Publications Ltd, c2013.
H 62 S472 2013
E-tivities: the key to active online learning.
Gilly Salmon.
New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 
c2013.
LB 1044.87 S25 2013
Exploring  digital libraries: foundations, practice, 
prospects.
Karen Calhoun.
London, UK: Facet Publishing, c2014.
ZA 4080 C35 2014
Getting  control  of yourself:  anger management 
tools & techniques.
with Christian Conte, Ph.D.
Mill Valley CA: Psychotherapy.net, c2012.
1 videodisc (75 minutes);  4 3/4 in. (DVD) + 1 instructor's 
manual (52 pages ; 18 cm)
Instructor's manual by Katie Read, MFT.
RC 569.5 A53 G47 2012 D1838
HBR guide to persuasive presentations.
Nancy Duarte.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, c2012.
HF 5718.22 D817 2012
The little book of stress relief.
David Posen.
Buffalo, NY: Firefly Books, c2012.
RA 785 P67 2012
Managing  business ethics: straight talk about how 
to do it right.
Linda Klebe Treviño, Katherine A. Nelson.
New York, NY: John Wiley, c2011.
HF 5387 T734 2011  
Mediating employment disputes.
Barry Kuretzky, Jennifer MacKenzie.
Toronto, ON: Canada Law Book, c2013.
KE 3206 K87 2013
Successful writing at work.
Philip C. Kolin.
Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, c2013.
PE 1408 K694 2013
Teaching  in  blended learning  environments: 
creating and sustaining communities of inquiry.
Norman D. Vaughan, Martha Cleveland-Innes, and 
D. Randy Garrison.
Edmonton, AB: AU Press, c2013.
LB 2395.7 V39 2013www.10-8.ca
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EVIDENCE AS A WHOLE 
SUPPORTS KNOWLEDGE 
& CONTROL
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a trial 
judge’s ruling that an accused committed 
theft, produced marihuana and possessed it 
for the purpose of trafficking. Thanh Bao 
Nguyen had argued that the evidence in the 
trial did not support the inference that he had 
the required knowledge and control of the 
marihuana grow operation. This evidence 
included the presence of his car on two 
occasions at the premises where the grow-op 
was located, his possession and use of the 
garage door opener, a sighting of him coming 
from the area of the front door of the premises, 
his exit from the garage about five hours after 
the police had commenced observation of the 
premises, and the seizure from his own home of 
documents related to the operation of a grow-
op. 
If the facts were taken individually, knowledge 
and control may not have been established. 
However, the trial judge was required to 
consider the evidence as a whole. The grow-
op would have been obvious to anyone 
entering the home and, in the Court of 
Appeal’s view, the whole of the evidence fully 
supported the inference that Nguyen had 
been inside the home and had the required 
knowledge and control. - R. v. Nguyen, 2014 
ONCA 7
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DISTURBANCE	 REQUIRES	 MORE	 
THAN	 YELLING	 AT	 POLICE
R. v. Kukemueller, 2014 ONCA 295
 
The fire department received a call to 
attend the accused’s rural address for 
a car fire. The car, which belonged to 
the accused’s girlfriend Wiles, had 
been crashed into a tree. The fire 
depar tment requested police  assistance. At the 
scene there was a crowd of young  people  who 
appeared to have been drinking. As firefighters 
extinguished the fire, police learned the vehicle fire 
may have been caused by people playing 
“demolition derby.” A police officer spoke to the 
accused and Wiles. They both smelled of alcohol. 
When Wiles told police that she had been driving 
the car when it hit the tree, she was arrested for 
dangerous driving  but struggled with the officer. The 
accused and some of his friends became upset and 
the officer used her emergency button to request 
backup. 
The police officer and a  firefighter took Wiles to the 
police car at the road and the crowd of young 
people started yelling. The accused was upset and 
yelling  and swearing. More officer’s arrived and, not 
long  afterwards, so did the accused’s father driving 
an off-road vehicle. He was arrested for impaired 
driving. The accused reacted with a  loud, profane 
and angry tirade against the police. About 22 
people, including  family members, friends, 
firefighters and police officers, were present. Even 
the accused’s grandmother came out of her house 
and tried to calm him down. The accused was 
arrested and charged with causing  a disturbance and 
later with assault. He allegedly scooped water from 
the toilet, threw it around and got some of it on a 
civilian cell monitor at the police station.
 
Ontario Court of Justice
 
The judge concluded that the  accused 
had caused a  disturbance. She found the 
accused’s “behaviour had an effect on 
the other family and friends who were 
present and contributed to raising  the  tension at the 
scene amongst those  people  as well as the police”. 
In her view, the accused’s behaviour “made things 
worse”. A conviction of causing  a disturbance in or 
near a public place contrary to s. 175(1)  (a) of the 
Criminal Code  was entered. As for the assault 
charge, the judge was not satisfied that the accused 
had deliberately  splashed water on the cell 
attendant. He was acquitted of assault.
 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
 
The accused’s appeal was unsuccessful.  
Since the accused’s conduct “contributed 
to raising  the tension at the scene,” an 
appeal judge found the trial judge did not 
err in in holding  that the offence of causing  a 
disturbance had been made out.
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
 
A further appeal by the accused 
was successful. The Ontario Court 
of Appeal concluded that the trial 
judge had e r red in law in 
determining  that a disturbance occurred. Although it 
was not condoning  yelling  obscenities at the police, 
conduct described as obnoxious or deplorable, the 
Court of Appeal found it was not criminal.
 
Under s. 175(1)(a)  it is an offence for someone who, 
“not being  in a dwelling-house, causes a disturbance 
in or near a public place, (i)  by fighting, screaming, 
shouting, swearing, singing  or using  insulting  or 
obscene language…” There are  two elements to this 
offence:
 
• the commission of one of the enumerated acts.
• the commission of the acts caused a disturbance 
in or near a public place.
 
In this case  there  was no doubt the accused 
committed one of the enumerated acts. He yelled 
and swore at the police. As for whether those acts 
“cause[d] a  disturbance in or near a public place,” 
the Court of Appeal found they did not.
 
The meaning  of “disturbance” in s. 175(1)(a)  is not 
so expansive as to include the mere disturbing  of the 
peace or tranquility on a person’s mind. Mere 
mental or emotional annoyance or disruption is 
Volume 14 Issue 3 - May/June 2014
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insufficient. Rather, the meaning  of “disturbance” is 
more restrictive and the enumerated conduct must 
cause, in the  words of R. v. Lohnes, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 
167, “an overtly  manifested disturbance which 
constitutes an interference with the ordinary  and 
customary use  by the public of the place in 
question”. The aim of the offence is “not the 
protection of individuals from emotional upset, but 
the protection of the  public from disorder calculated 
to interfere with the public’s normal activities” and 
interference “with the  ordinary use of a place”. 
Emotional upset does not amount to interference 
with the ordinary and customary use  of the premises 
by the public.
 
Here, the accused’s conduct did not satisfy  the 
second element of the offence – causing  a 
disturbance in or near a public place. “There was no 
evidence and no finding  that the [accused’s] conduct 
interfered with the public’s normal activities or with 
the ordinary and customary use by the public of the 
place in question,” said Justice  Sharpe on behalf of 
the Court of Appeal. “Contributing  to raising  the 
tension at the scene of an interaction between the 
police and the public does not amount to the kind of 
disturbance that is required for this offence to be 
made out.” As for the accused’s grandmother coming 
out of her house and trying  to calm him down, she 
was “simply concerned about his well-being. She 
thought that he would listen to her. She testified that 
she was ‘upset’ but … emotional upset does not 
amount to a disturbance.”
 
The accused’s appeal was allowed and his 
conviction for causing a disturbance was set aside.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
CAUSING	 A	 DISTURBANCE:
A	 COMMENTARY
Section 175 of the  Criminal Code  creates the offence 
of causing a disturbance. It reads (in part):
What is a Disturbance?
 
In R. v. Lohnes, [1992] 1 SCR 167 the Supreme 
Court of Canada considered this section. First, it 
found the word “disturbance” was capable of many 
meanings. But just what is a disturbance such that 
criminal liability would attach? The Court found it 
was more than mere emotional disturbance, 
annoyance or anxiety. Simply applying  a mental 
disturbance test was not sufficient. In the Court’s 
view:
“There must be an externally manifested 
disturbance of the public peace, in the 
sense of interference with the ordinary 
and customary use of the premises by 
the public.” 
It must be something  more than people being  upset, 
offended or their feelings hurt.
“Contributing to raising the tension at the 
scene of an interaction between the police 
and the public does not amount to the kind of 
disturbance that is required for this offence 
to be made out.”
s. 175 Criminal Code
(1) Every one who
(a)  not being in a dwelling-house, causes a 
disturbance in or near a public place,
(i)  by fighting, screaming, shouting, swearing, 
singing or using insulting or obscene language,
... ... ...
is guilty of an offence punishable on summary 
conviction.
Evidence of peace officer
(2) In the absence of other evidence, or by way 
of corroboration of other evidence, a summary 
conviction court may infer from the evidence of a 
peace officer relating to the conduct of a person 
or persons, whether ascertained or not, that a 
disturbance described in paragraph (1)(a) ... was 
caused or occurred.
www.10-8.ca
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The actus reus for causing  a disturbance has two 
components:
1. The accused must have engaged in one of the 
enumerated acts, which includes “screaming, 
shouting, swearing, or using  insulting  or 
obscene language” and
2. The accused’s actions must have caused “an 
externally manifested disturbance of the public 
peace, in the  sense of interference with the 
ordinary and customary use of the premises by 
the public.” The Lohne’s Court went on to add:
As the cases illustrate, the interference 
with the ordinary and customary 
conduct in or near the public place 
may consist in something as small as 
being distracted from one's work. But 
it must be present and it must be 
externally manifested. 
The Supreme Court, in looking  at the French version 
of s. 175(1), noted the test would be satisfied if 
actions by an accused resulted in an “externally 
manifested disturbance involving  violent noise or 
confusion disrupting  the tranquillity of those using 
the area in question.”
 
In addition, there are the elements of “not being  in a 
dwelling‑house” and “in or near a public place.”
 
So then, can a police officer be disturbed 
when responding  to a call? A couple of recent 
decisions that post-date Lohnes seem to say no.
 
In R. v. Swinkels, 2010 ONCA 742, two police 
officers were patrolling  downtown just as the bars 
were closing. They heard someone yell obscenities 
from within a large crowd of about 15-20 people 
outside a bar. The officers pulled over to investigate, 
and as they exited their police car Bradley Swinkels 
came quickly towards one of them yelling  further 
obscenities. Swinkels arms were straight out and his 
middle fingers were up.  An officer believed that 
Swinkels was about to assault or grab him, so the 
officer pulled him to the ground and arrested him for 
causing  a disturbance. Swinkels was convicted at 
trial of causing  a disturbance but a majority of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the conviction. 
Justice LaForme stated, “Generally	 speaking,	 the	 
trial	 jurisprudence	 has	 held	 that	 shouting	 
obscenities	 at	 police	 officers	 is	 not	 a	 
disturbance	 in	 and	 of	 itself.”	 The Court went on 
to add that “a	 ‘public	 disturbance’	 requires	 
more 	 than	 a	 crowd	 observing 	 ‒	 or	 even	 
shouting 	 anti-police	 sentiments	 at	 ‒	 police	 
officers	 in	 the 	 course 	 of	 arrest.” In this case, the 
evidence was that the people that had gathered were 
“a normal bar type crowd,” the streets were packed 
and there was “ongoing  yelling” in the area. It was 
not Swinkels who had initially caused the crowd to 
gather and while a  group of onlookers did gather 
around the  police, it happened only after the police 
engaged him to make an arrest. 
 
In R. v. Walker, 2007 ONCA 104, the accused was a 
police officer convicted of assault causing  bodily 
harm. He was patrolling  when he saw a man he 
believed may have been in a gang  and fit the 
description of someone wanted for arrest. He 
quickly realized the man was not the person wanted 
but continued to question him anyways. The man 
loudly insulted the officer, accusing  him of being 
racist. The officer felt the man was causing  a 
disturbance because people on the street were 
watching. He arrested the man, but the man resisted. 
The officer knocked the man to the ground, breaking 
his cheek bone. Walker unsuccessfully appealed to 
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice which was 
affirmed on appeal by the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
Walker tried to argue that  the man, through his 
actions of berating  him, caused a disturbance and 
could be arrested for it. The man resisted the officer's 
efforts to place him under arrest and, as a result, the 
officer was entitled to use reasonable force to effect 
the arrest. Here is what the Ontario Court of Appeal 
had to say:
 
Even if there was a "disturbance," in common 
parlance, there was no "disturbance" within the 
meaning of the Criminal Code in this case. The 
trial judge found that the [officer] had no right to 
continue investigating or questioning the 
complainant. While the complainant's loud and 
rude protestations may have been "disturbing" to 
some, they did not constitute reasonable 
grounds for the [officer] whose improper actions 
instigated the exchange to believe there was a 
criminal disturbance.
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Walker tried appealing  to the Supreme Court of 
Canada but it did not want to hear the case.
 
Here are some other note-able quotes:
“[S]imply swearing at a police officer, 
without more, is not a crime.” - R. v 
Murphy, 2013 CanLII 40807
“[T]he law is clear that yelling and 
swearing in a public place is not in 
itself a criminal offence.  Equally, the 
existence of emotional disturbance, 
such as [the constable’s] belief that the 
defendant’s language was vulgar, 
aggressive and inappropriate, is 
insufficient to establish a disturbance 
within section 175(1)(a).” - R. v. Osbourne, 
2008 ONCJ 742
s. 175(2) Criminal Code
But what of s. 175(2)? What this appears to say is 
that a police officer can give evidence of a 
disturbance sufficient for a  conviction without the 
necessity  of Crown to call individual members of the 
public as witnesses to establish that they were 
disturbed. Rather, a  judge can infer the fact of a 
disturbance from a police officer’s testimony. 
Of course, this requires more than the officer simply 
stating  that they were  upset/offended/disturbed. 
Instead, the officer should look at what is happening 
around them. Are other people being  disturbed? 
What are they doing? Are they gathering  in a crowd? 
Are they stopping  what they normally would be 
expected to do? What activity is normally associated 
with the place? Is what is happening  now different 
than what is expected? In the words of Lohnes, “Is 
there  an externally manifested disturbance of the 
public peace, in the sense of interference with the 
ordinary and customary use  of the premises by the 
public?” 
Although not required by subsection (2) a civilian 
witness or two for court might be most beneficial.
REASONABLE	 GROUNDS	 NEED	 
ONLY	 BE	 RATIONALLY	 
SUPPORTED
R. v. Churko, 2014 SKCA 41
 
Shortly before 1:00 am, the accused 
was observed driving  into the 
parking  lot of a bar. A police officer 
patrolling  in the  parking  lot observed 
that his driving  and the way he 
stopped his vehicle were abnormal or out of the 
ordinary. The accused entered the parking  lot at a 
higher rate of speed than would normally be 
expected and then came to an abrupt stop. When 
the accused got out of his vehicle he appeared to 
hold onto the door to steady his balance. The officer 
approached and detected a smell of alcohol coming 
from the accused’s breath and saw that his eyes were 
bloodshot. The officer arrested the  accused and 
subsequently made a breath demand.  Samples of 
150 mg% and 130 mg% were obtained and charges 
of impaired driving and over 80mg% were laid.
 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
 
The police  officer testified that he arrested 
the accused because he had reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe he was 
impaired. The trial judge accepted the 
officer’s observations but determined that they 
established only reasonable suspicion or, at most, a 
subjective belief in reasonable  and probable 
grounds. The observations did not sufficiently reach 
the level of objective grounds necessary for arrest. 
The judge concluded that the accused’s s. 9 Charter 
right had been violated and the Certificate of 
Analysis was excluded under s. 24(2). As for the 
impaired driving  charge, the judge had a reasonable 
doubt that the accused’s ability to operate  a motor 
vehicle was impaired. The accused was found not 
guilty of all charges.
 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
 
The appeal judge found the observations 
of the police officer and the evidence as a 
whole  established both a subjective and 
objective belief there were reasonable and 
probable grounds for the breath demand:
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… I am of the opinion that [the officer] 
subjectively held reasonable grounds to arrest 
[the accused] at the point in time when he 
exited his truck and I am of the view that his 
grounds were justifiable on an objective basis. At 
that moment, [the officer] was not required to 
establish that an indictable offence had been 
committed on a balance of probabilities, and I 
am also satisfied that he had more than just a 
“reasonable suspicion” or hunch. In this regard, I 
am taking  into consideration that all evidence 
available to the officer has to be viewed 
cumulatively and not in piecemeal fashion. 
Las t ly, the s tandard mus t be appl ied 
contextually, having  regard to the events leading 
up to the arrest, the dynamics at play, and the 
experience and training of the arresting  officer. 
[2013 SKQB 235 at para. 27]
 
The accused’s over 80 mg% acquittal was set aside 
and a conviction was entered.
 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
 
The accused then challenged his 
conviction, arguing  the appeal 
judge erred in determining  that the 
officer had the requisite reasonable 
grounds. Justice Ottenbriet, on behalf of the Court, 
stated:
 
… The reasonableness of the police officer's 
belief must be considered by the trial court from 
the vantage point of whether the observations 
and circumstances articulated by the officer are 
rationally capable of supporting  the inference of 
impairment which is drawn by the officer; 
however, the Crown does not have to prove the 
inferences drawn were true or even accurate. In 
other words, the factors articulated by the 
arresting  officer need not prove the accused was 
actually impaired. This is so because that is the 
standard of proof reserved for a trial on the 
merits, a proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
 
In this case, the observations and circumstances 
as a whole articulated by the police officer and 
accepted by both the trial judge and the 
summary conviction appeal court judge are 
rationally capable of establishing an objective 
belief of impairment and therefore reasonable 
and probable grounds. The trial judge erred in 
the application of the burden on the Crown to 
establish reasonable and probable grounds and 
appeared to require that the facts articulated by 
the police officer ‘would reasonably lead to a 
conclusion that this man was driving  while 
impaired by alcohol [emphasis added]” ... 
[paras. 5-6]
The appeal court judge correctly concluded that the 
trial judge erred in determining  the officer lacked 
reasonable and probable grounds. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“The reasonableness of the police 
officer's belief must be considered by the 
trial court from the vantage point of 
whether the observations and 
circumstances articulated by the officer 
are rationally capable of supporting the 
inference of impairment which is drawn by 
the officer.”
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Sentencing: Dial-A-Doping
“It is well known that dial-a-dope 
operations enable a pervasive and 
rapid dissemination of illicit 
narcotics that wreak destruction to 
both the individuals who use them and to our 
community. The proliferation of these operations has 
significantly increased accessibility to these drugs, 
and their harmful effects. As a result, the courts have 
routinely recognized that the primary objectives in 
imposing sentences for trafficking in this manner 
must be deterrence and denunciation..” – British 
Columbia Court of Appeal Justice Neilson in R. v. Gill, 
2013 BCCA 320 at para. 22, upholding a six-month custodial sentence 
for selling 0.8 grams of cocaine in a dial-a-dope scenario.  
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CROWN	 NOT	 REQUIRED	 TO	 
DETAIL	 EVERY	 MINUTE	 OF	 
DELAY
R. v. Singh, 2014 ONCA 293
 
While patrolling  various licenced 
establishments, a police officer 
stopped the accused driving  at 1:52 
am. The officer formed a suspicion 
the accused was operating  a vehicle 
with alcohol in his body and made an ASD demand 
at 1:58  am. A suitable sample was provided at 2:00 
am and a FAIL registered. The officer then arrested 
the accused at 2:01 am for operating  a  motor 
vehicle while over 80 mg%. She was the read her 
right to counsel, cautioned and given a breathalyzer 
demand at 2:05 am. The accused was transported to 
the police station, arriving  at 2:22 am, where she 
was presented to the breath technician at 3:11 
am.  The first breath sample of 170 mg% was 
obtained at 3:22 am and a second sample of 160 mg
% was taken at 3:50 am.
 
Chronology
 
2:01 AM: accused arrested
2:05 AM: breathalyzer demand given
2:22 AM: arresting officer and accused arrived at the 
police station
3:11 AM: accused delivered to the breath technician
3:22 AM: first breath sample taken = 170 mg%
3:50 AM: second breath sample taken = 160 mg%
 
Ontario Court of Justice
 
At trial the accused argued that the second 
breath sample was not taken “as soon as 
practicable” after the first breath test as 
required by s. 258  (1)(c)(ii)  of the Criminal 
Code. In his view, the Crown had failed to 
specifically  explain, by calling  evidence, the 28-
minute delay between the first and second breath 
samples. The judge, however, rejected this 
submission. In the  judge’s opinion, the Crown need 
not provide an explanation for every minute that the 
accused was in police custody. He concluded that 
all of the times were reasonable and that the police 
had acted “as soon as practicable.” The accused was 
convicted of over 80 mg%.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
 
The accused successfully appealed his 
conviction. The appeal judge noted that 
an interval of 17 to 20 minutes between 
samples is commonly seen, in light of the 
statutory requirement that there be  an interval of at 
least 15 minutes between the taking  of the two 
samples. In this case, however, there  was an 
unexplained delay of 8-11 minutes. With this 
unexplained gap between the two tests, the Crown 
had failed to prove the samples were not taken "as 
soon as practicable" The accused’s conviction was 
quashed and an acquittal was entered.
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
 
The Crown appealed the acquittal 
submitting  that the trial judge did 
not err in finding  the samples were 
taken “as soon as practicable.” The 
Court of Appeal agreed. In its view, just because 
there  is an unexplained gap between two samples 
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the 
“as soon as practicable” requirement was not met. 
The Crown is not required to provide a  detailed 
account of every  minute an accused is in custody, 
including between tests:
 
The requirement that the samples be taken "as 
soon as practicable" does not mean "as soon as 
possible". It means nothing more than that the 
tests should be administered within a reasonably 
prompt time in the overall circumstances. A trial 
judge should look at the whole chain of events, 
keeping in mind that the Criminal Code permits 
an outside limit of two hours from the time of 
the offence to the taking of the first test. The "as 
soon as practicable" requirement must be 
applied with reason.
 
“The requirement that the samples be taken ‘as soon as practicable’ does not mean ‘as 
soon as possible’. It means nothing more than that the tests should be administered within a 
reasonably prompt time in the overall circumstances.”
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It is worth repeating  that the Crown is not 
required to call evidence to provide a detailed 
explanation of what occurred during every 
minute that the accused is in custody. These 
provisions of the Criminal Code were enacted to 
expedite the trial process by facilitating the 
introduction of reliable evidence to prove an 
accused's blood-alcohol level. Interpreting these 
provisions to require an exact accounting of 
every moment in the chronology from the time 
of the offence to the second test runs counter to 
their purpose. … "The touchstone for 
determining  whether the tests were taken as 
soon as practicable is whether the police acted 
reasonably." [references omitted, paras. 14-15]
 
Here, the trial judge found the samples were taken 
as soon as practicable. There was no evidence the 
delay between the two samples was related to the 
reliability of the test results nor did the trial judge 
misinterpret or misapply s. 258  (1)  (c)  (ii)  to the facts 
of this case. The Crown’s appeal was allowed and 
the accused’s conviction was restored.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
NO	 LINK	 BETWEEN	 CRIMES	 &	 
RESIDENCE:	 ITO	 INSUFFICIENT	 
TO	 SUPPORT	 WARRANT
R. v. Liu & Le, 2014 BCCA 166
 
Acting  on the information of five 
confidential informants, the police 
investigated Liu and Le  for drug 
trafficking. These informers provided 
broadly consistent information that 
an individual known as “Greek Peter” was selling 
drugs. Four different informers indicated that Greek 
Peter was trafficking  drugs on behalf of Le while  one 
also said that Liu and Le were involved in providing 
cocaine to Greek Peter for the purposes of 
trafficking. The affiant also received an anonymous 
phone call from a tipster stating  that a Vietnamese 
man named Michael and an Asian woman named 
Coco were selling  cocaine  at the kilogram level. The 
anonymous caller also indicated that the couple 
lived in an apartment building. Based on information 
from two of these informers and police  interviews 
with representatives of certain apartment buildings, 
the police confirmed that Greek Peter lived in a 
building  known as Regiment Square. It was believed 
that he dealt drugs near his residence. Greek Peter’s 
suppliers were said to be a man known as “Viet 
Mike” (Le) and a woman named “Coco” (Liu). 
During  a four-week period of surveillance, including 
the use of vehicle  trafficking  devices, the police 
observed Liu and Le using  a magnetic  fob to gain 
entry  into the parking  garage of Regiment Square 
and from there using  a key to enter Greek Peter’s 
apartment. There was evidence that one or both of 
them visited Regiment Square nine times, staying 
only  a  short while each time. The police decided to 
arrest both Liu and Le as they left Regiment Square. 
Le was in possession of $780 in cash and Liu had 
$2,157, but neither of them was in possession of 
drugs. The police then obtained search warrants for 
Greek Peter’s residence, as well as Liu and Le’s 
apartment where police seized significant quantities 
of drugs, including  740 grms. of cocaine, 140 grms. 
of heroin and $45,000 cash along  with other 
evidence consistent with drug trafficking.
 
British Columbia Provincial Court
 
The accused argued that the information 
deposed in the ITO was insufficient to 
support the search warrant for their home. 
They argued that without a  valid warrant, 
the search breached s. 8  of the Charter and the 
evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2). 
The judge found the warrant was lawfully issued. 
She held that a common sense inference could be 
drawn that drugs were stored at the accused’s 
apartment. This inference was not based on the  fact 
that this was merely their home, but that it was 
where  they generally returned after their short visits 
to Greek  Peter’s residence. In the judge’s view, the 
travel patterns provided an evidentiary  basis upon 
which the issuing  justice could reasonably have 
concluded that Liu and Le were supplying  Greek 
Peter with cocaine stored at their residence. In 
exchange, they  received cash that they took back to 
their apartment. The search and seizure did not 
violate the Charter and the evidence was admissible. 
Liu and Le were convicted possessing  controlled 
substances (cocaine and heroin)  for the purpose of 
trafficking.
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 British Columbia Court of Appeal
 
Liu and Le  submitted that there 
was no object ive bas is for 
believing  there was a  link between 
their apparent trafficking  activities 
and their home. They noted that there were nine 
instances detailed in the  ITO where one or both of 
them likely  attended at Greek Peter’s Regiment 
Square apartment, but an absence of information 
about where they were before or after they visited it. 
In their view, the police were merely engaged in a 
fishing  expedition when their was searched. So, 
even assuming  the police had credible grounds to 
believe they were trafficking  drugs, the facts set out 
in the ITO did not support a credibly based 
probability that cocaine would be  found in their 
home. 
The Crown, on the other hand, conceded that the 
ITO would be insufficient if it rested solely on the 
basis that there would be drugs in Liu and Le’s home 
because  they were drug  dealers. However, the 
Crown suggested that a reasonable inference could 
be drawn from the ITO that the accused used their 
apartment to store drugs. The threshold, the Crown 
opined, was that the  apartment was a probable 
storage place.
 
Justice Garson, delivering  the  Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, first summarized the jurisprudence 
regarding  the legal standard for reviewing  the 
validity of a search warrant. She said this:
 
• The trial judge’s role in reviewing  the validity 
of a search warrant is to consider whether the 
material filed in support of the warrant, as 
amplified on review, could support the 
issuance of the warrant.
• The trial judge should examine the 
information in its totality, not on a piece 
meal basis, in a “practical, non-technical, 
and common sense basis”.
• The question is not whether the reviewing 
judge would have granted the order, but 
whether there was an objective basis on 
which the issuing justice could have done so.
• The appropriate standard is one of 
“reasonable probability” rather than “proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt” or “prima facie 
case”. The phrase “reasonable belief” also 
approximates the requisite standard.
• Reasonable grounds may be said to exist at 
“ the point at which credibly-based 
probability replaces suspicion”.
 
The Court of Appeal found there was insufficient 
grounds to justify the search warrant for the 
accuseds’ apartment. Although there was 
overwhelming  evidence that Greek Peter was 
trafficking  drugs and information that could provide 
reasonable grounds for the police  to conclude the 
accuseds were trafficking  in drugs with him, there 
was not enough to provide a reasonable  belief that 
evidence of drug  trafficking  would be found at their 
apartment. Despite the tracking  devices and 
frequent surveillance, the police did not observe the 
accused depart from their apartment before 
attending Regiment Square. Justice Garson stated:
 
In my view, the ITO filed in support of the 
warrant, as amplified and excised on review, did 
not disclose a basis on which the issuing justice 
could conclude that there was a reasonable 
probability drugs were being stored at the 
[accuseds’] residence. The totality of the 
circumstances, including the frequency of the 
[accused’s] attendance at Regiment Square, does 
not lead to a credibly based probability that the 
drugs were coming from [the accuseds’ 
residence]. There is a gap in the information as 
to the [accused’s] point of origin prior to their 
alleged delivery of drugs to Regiment Square. 
This gap is curious given that police placed 
tracking devices on the [accuseds’] vehicles. In 
my view, there is nothing more (on the 
information presented in the ITO) than 
supposition that the drugs were originating from 
[the accuseds’ residence]. [para. 45]
 
The trial judge erred in concluding  that the ITO, as 
amplified and excised on review, disclosed 
reasonable grounds to issue a search warrant for the 
accuseds’ apartment. Section 8 had been breached 
and a new trial was ordered so the proper 
application of s. 24(2) could be applied.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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CUMULATIVE	 CIRCUMSTANCES	 
JUSTIFY	 STRIP	 SEARCH
R. v. Mammadov, 2014 ONCA 328
 
Shortly after midnight an eyewitness 
saw the accused crash into a traffic 
sign, leave his car, walk across the 
roadway, throw items into a nearby 
wooded area  and then return to his 
car. The witness called police and, when an officer 
arrived, the accused left his car and tried to run 
away. But he was caught. He was intoxicated, 
arrested and transported to the police station where 
he provided two breath samples. After the 
investigation was complete, the accused was strip 
searched and lodged in a cell until police 
considered him sober enough to be released.
 
Ontario Court of Justice
 
At trial the judge found the strip  search 
unrelated to gathering  evidence nor for 
investigative purposes. The arresting 
officer said he was worried the accused 
was carrying  something  that he might use to harm 
himself. The sergeant in charge, however, said that 
the accused was strip  searched as a matter of routine 
– he was being  lodged in a cell. The Crown 
conceded this was a s. 8  Charter breach. The 
accused then admitted he was impaired at the time 
of the offence but wanted a stay of proceedings 
under s. 24(1).
 
The judge refused to grant a stay and convicted the 
accused of impaired driving. In her view, the strip 
search had no impact on trial fairness nor on the 
accused’s ability to make full answer and defence. 
The strip  search had nothing  to do with the 
collection of evidence against the accused nor was 
any evidence obtained as a  result of the s. 8 breach. 
As for whether irreparable  prejudice would be 
caused to the integrity of the justice system if the 
prosecution were to continue, the trial judge 
considered the gravity of the breach and the manner 
in which the search was conducted. She found the 
search was carried out in a private room where the 
accused was given the opportunity to remove his 
clothing  himself and the procedure followed by the 
officers ensured that he was never completely 
naked. The arresting  officer was sensitive to the 
intrusive nature  of a  strip search and took whatever 
steps he could to minimize the inherent traumatic 
effects that flowed from it. As for the gravity of the 
breach, the judge found the police did not lack 
reasonable and probable grounds to conduct the 
strip search. The arresting  officer’s concern for the 
accused’s safety, the judge found, could reasonably 
arise from (1) the accused disposing  of unknown 
items at the scene of the collision; (2)  his attempt to 
flee; (3) his severe impairment; and (4) vomiting 
twice while in custody.
 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
 
The appeal court dismissed the accused’s 
appeal from his conviction for impaired 
driving. The appeal judge found no error 
in the approach taken by the trial judge.
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
 
The accused sought leave to further 
appeal. He submitted the trial 
judge erred in not entering  a stay 
under s. 24(1)  for the conceded 
violation of his s. 8  Charter breach. In his view, the 
trial judge did not properly  apply the objective 
component of the test for justifying  a strip search as 
explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679. He contended that the 
judge did not look for the objective confirmation of 
the arresting  officer’s subjective safety concern. 
Instead, the accused argued that the circumstances 
outlined by the trial judge only gave rise  to a 
generalized concern for safety and did not amount 
to objective evidence of the likelihood that he had 
secreted anything  with which he could harm 
himself.
 
The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed that “the 
circumstances described by the trial judge [could] 
be placed in such watertight compartments.” Here, 
the Court of Appeal found “the cumulative 
circumstances set out by the trial judge gave rise to a 
concern for the [accused’s] safety and amounted to 
reasonable and probable grounds to strip  search 
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him.” Thus, the objective standard required by 
Golden had been met.
 
The trial judge did not err in exercising  her 
discretion to refuse to grant a stay  and the accused’s 
application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
TOTALITY	 OF	 CIRCUMSTANCES	 	 
CONSIDERED	 IN	 ARREST	 
ANALYSIS
R. v Canlas, 2014 ABCA 160
 
A police  officer assigned to a roving 
traffic unit pulled over a Suburban 
driving  near Vermillion, Alberta. The 
accused was the driver and he had 
one passenger with him. When the 
door to the Suburban was first opened, the officer 
smelled a faint odour of raw marijuana, (although no 
marijuana would later be found). The officer also 
made the following additional observations:
 
• A large can of air freshener in the passenger 
side door compartment, which he knew was 
often used to conceal drug odours.
• Fast food wrappers littering  the vehicle, 
consistent with drug  couriers being  unwilling  to 
leave their vehicle to eat while travelling.
• When the accused was asked why he was 
speeding, he said he was to get to a basketball 
tournament in Saskatoon which was to start two 
hours later, at 5 pm that day; however, neither 
the accused nor his passenger were able to 
provide the location of where they were  to play, 
the schedule or plans for the tournament, or the 
full name of their coach.
• A parka lay across the backseat concealing 
what was beneath it. When the  officer returned 
to the Suburban after running  a document 
search, he  noted a basketball had been placed 
on top of the parka which he interpreted as an 
effort to support the  occupants’ earlier claims 
that they were headed to a basketball 
tournament. He found this action extremely 
odd.
• The accused and his passenger appeared very 
nervous when first spoken to, continually 
rubbing  their hands over their limbs. This 
nervousness increased rather than decreased as 
the interaction continued, which in the officer’s 
experience was inconsistent with what usually 
happens. A stopped driver is initially nervous 
but then calms as he talks to the police.
• The accused and his passenger initially became 
vague when asked for further details about the 
basketball tournament. When later questioned 
separately they provided inconsis tent 
information as to the details of the tournament 
and as to their own occupations.
 
The accused was arrested for possessing  a  controlled 
substance and the Suburban was searched. In the 
vehicle police located four ounces of crack cocaine 
under the parka, 190 ecstasy pills, numerous 
cellphones, a camera and over $5,000 in currency. 
A loaded handgun was also found under the 
vehicle’s seat.
 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
 
The arresting  officer testified that he had 
dealt with a variety  of narcotics 
throughout his career and his experience 
made him very familiar with the smell of 
marijuana in any amount, at any stage of processing. 
The judge determined that under all of the 
circumstances the officer had the requisite  subjective 
as well as reasonable and probable grounds to arrest 
the accused and search the vehicle. There was no 
Charter breach and the evidence was admitted. The 
accused was convicted of possessing  a controlled 
substance for the purpose of trafficking  and 
possessing a loaded firearm.
 
Alberta Court of Appeal
 
The accused suggested the grounds 
for a r res t and search were 
inadequate. But Justice Bielby, 
delivering  the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment, found the police actions lawful under s. 
495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which provides that 
a peace officer may arrest without warrant a  person 
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who, on reasonable and probable grounds, they 
believe has committed an indictable offence.
 
For an arrest to be lawful under s. 495(1)(a)  there are 
two components that must be satisfied; (1)  subjective 
and (2)  objective. As for the subjective component of 
the standard, the officer testified he believed he had 
grounds to arrest. This subjective belief went 
unchallenged.
 
As for the objective test, a court is required to 
determine “whether the entire constellation of facts 
suggests the reasonable and probable  existence of 
criminal behaviour.” In this case, the trial judge was 
not limited to the quality of the  marihuana odour. 
She was entitled to consider the totality of the 
circumstances in determining  whether there were 
reasonable grounds to believe an offence had been 
committed. Justice Bielby stated:
 
In regard to the objective component, she 
expressly observed that while one piece of 
evidence, such as the can of air freshener maybe 
dismissed as a neutral factor, context and 
circumstances are key in assessing  the entire 
collection of pieces of evidence. That collection 
included [the accused’s] nervousness, the 
inconsistent stories relating  to the basketball 
tournament, the faint smell of marijuana, the air 
fresher, the parka and the basketball. This totality 
of evidence objectively supported her 
conclusion that reasonable grounds for arrest 
had been established objectively as well as 
subjectively. [para. 12]
 
The arresting  officer's experience also played a role 
in the objective analysis.
 
The Court of Appeal also dismissed that suggestion 
that the statements he made about the basketball 
tournament should not have been considered by the 
trial judge in the  reasonable grounds analysis. They 
were made before his arrest, but after the traffic stop 
and he had not yet been cautioned or given 
information about his right to counsel. He argued 
that he was detained at the time and the only 
questions the officer could ask were those relating  to 
driving  offences. He was never told he was free  to 
leave, nor was he advised that he was not under any 
obligation to answer questions other than those 
relating  to driving  offences. Although this issue was 
not argued at trial nor raised in the accused’s 
constitutional notice of appeal, Justice  Bilby found 
the questions posed by the officer before the 
accused’s arrest were relevant to his investigation of 
traffic offences as well as his concern that criminal 
activity had or was occurring. “He first asked [the 
accused] why he was speeding, a question which 
could well fall within the proper ambit of 
questioning  for the apparent traffic violations,” said 
Justice Bielby. “[The accused’s] answers revealing 
deficiencies in his knowledge of basketball 
tournament details, flowed naturally  and logically 
from the question about speeding.” She continued:
 
This situation is parallel to that considered by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v Nolet, 2010 
SCC 24, … in 2010 where an officer discovered 
contraband while searching  the cab of a truck as 
authorized by provincial legislation in the 
context of investigating a regulatory offence. The 
court concluded that the evidence of contraband 
discovered there was properly admitted at trial 
because the officer in conducting  the search did 
so with a dual purpose - to find evidence of a 
regulatory offence as well as evidence of a 
criminal offence. [para. 18]
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
AT	 POINT	 OF	 DETENTION	 
OFFICER	 HAD	 REASONABLE	 
SUSPICION:	 NO	 s.	 9	 BREACH
R. v. Papilion, 2014 SKCA 45
 
At about 2:05 am a patrol officer 
noticed a Ford Explorer travelling 
towards him. It was not being  driven 
erratically, it was not speeding, and 
had no mechanical issues. However, 
the town was having  problems with vandalism and 
break and enters into vehicles in the area where the 
vehicle was headed. As the officer drove  down the 
road he came across a parked Ford Explorer with the 
lights off. As he drove  by, he noticed that the  driver’s 
seat was reclined and saw a head “bob” up  and 
down. The officer backed up  and pulled behind the 
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Explorer.  He got out of his marked patrol car and 
approached the driver’s side of the Explorer. The 
driver’s side window was rolled down and the officer 
saw a male in the  driver’s seat, a female in the 
passenger seat, and a strong  odour of alcohol 
coming from the vehicle. 
The driver provided his driver’s licence upon request 
and said that he had a  few beers when asked about 
drinking. When he got the driver to exit the Explorer, 
the officer noted the accused had slightly  red, 
bloodshot eyes, slightly slurred speech, and the 
odour of alcohol on his breath. An approved 
screening  device demand was given and the 
accused failed the test. The officer concluded that 
the accused’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was 
impaired by alcohol, the breath demand was made, 
the right to counsel and police warnings given and a 
reading  of 110 mg% was obtained at 2:45 am. The 
Intoxilyzer registered an ambient failure  as the 
officer readied it for the second test. He waited a 
short time and prepared the instrument again. The 
second test, taken at 3:13 am, also resulted in a 
reading  of 110 mg%. The accused was charged with 
impaired driving and driving over 80 mg%.
 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
 
The judge found that the  accused was 
arbitrarily detained under s. 9 of the 
Charter when the officer “attended” on 
the Explorer. In the judge’s view, the 
officer was not “checking  for sobriety, licences, 
ownership, or mechanical fitness of the accused’s 
vehicle” and therefore he was not acting  pursuant to 
statutory authority  conferred under s. 209.1 of 
Saskatchewan’s Traffic Safety Act. Nor was there any 
evidence that the officer had reasonable grounds to 
believe the accused was involved in criminal 
activity. Although the accused’s actions may have 
been “odd,” this was insufficient to establish 
reasonable grounds. Instead, the judge held the 
officer was engaged in “preventative policing” which 
was an impermissible authority upon which to 
detain or investigate the accused. As a result of the s. 
9 breach, all of the evidence was excluded under s. 
24(2), including  the fail reading  on the approved 
screening  device, the  Intoxilyzer results, and the 
indicia of impairment noted by the officer. The 
accused was acquitted on both charges.
 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
 
The Crown successfully appealed the 
acquittal. The appeal judge found that the 
trial judge made a legal error in 
concluding  that the accused was 
detained when the officer stopped his vehicle 
behind the Explorer. Instead, the  detention occurred 
when the officer asked the accused to produce his 
driver’s licence. However, in the appeal judge’s 
opinion the officer “had the unfettered right to do 
that in the exercise of his responsibilities pursuant to 
s. 209.1.” When the officer smelled alcohol on his 
approach to the vehicle  he then had reasonable 
grounds to detain the accused for investigative 
purposes related to the Criminal Code. The evidence 
was admissible and a new trial was ordered.
 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
 
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
disagreed with the appeal judge’s 
view that the officer had the 
“unfettered right” to detain the 
accused under s. 209.1. Section 209.1 does not 
create a general power of detention for investigative 
purposes. Rather, the officer must be pursuing  a 
traffic safety purpose in order to randomly stop  a 
motorist pursuant to this provision, such as checking 
for sobriety, licences, ownership, insurance  and the 
mechanical fitness of cars. Justice Herhauf, 
delivering the Court of Appeal’s judgment, stated:
 
There was no evidence to support the view that 
[the officer] was acting  pursuant to a traffic 
safety purpose prior to his questioning the 
[accused]. The only evidence with regard to [the 
officer’s] purpose at the relevant time was his 
concern that the [accused] was acting strangely 
by turning his car shortly after he spotted a 
police vehicle, by stopping his vehicle shortly 
thereafter, and by ducking his head down when 
[the officer] looked at him. [The officer] also had 
concerns related to the time of night and the 
area that the car was in. That area had been 
experiencing  higher than average crime rates. 
These observations and suspicions do not relate 
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to sobriety, licences, ownership, insurance or the 
mechanical fitness of the vehicle, nor do they 
provide a basis upon which such a motive could 
be attributed. For this reason, it is my view that s. 
209.1 of The Traffic Safety Act is not applicable 
to this case. [para. 22]
 
Detention
 
The meaning  of detention under s. 9 includes 
situations sometimes referred to as psychological 
detention - a reasonable person would conclude by 
reason of the police conduct that they have no 
choice but to comply with a direction or demand. In 
this case, the accused was not detained when the 
officer parked his vehicle behind the Explorer.
 
[The officer] did not pull over the [accused’s] 
vehicle, nor did he engage his police lights. In 
this case [the officer] pulled in behind a parked 
car - he did not block the vehicle's exit path. 
There is no evidence to suggest that a spotlight 
was placed on the [accused] or that [the officer] 
otherwise indicated that the [accused] was 
specifically under suspicion. [para. 32]
 
However, a detention materialized when the officer 
started asking  the accused questions relating  to 
producing  his licence and whether he had been 
drinking. “A reasonable person at that point would 
not have felt that they were free  to leave,” said 
Justice Herauf. But by this time, the officer had 
smelled the odour of alcohol emanating  from the 
vehicle which, along  with his other observations, 
provided the reasonable suspicion necessary for 
making  an investigative detention, which was not 
arbitrary:
 
In this case, [the officer] detected an odour of 
alcohol emanating from the vehicle as he 
approached the [accused’s] window. On 
smelling alcohol, and having  observed the 
unusual behaviour involving  [the accused] 
popping  his head up to peek out of his truck, 
[the officer] had reasonable grounds to suspect 
[the accused] was committing or had committed 
the Criminal Code offences of being in care or 
control of a vehicle while impaired or with 
blood alcohol content above .08. As a result, … 
he was lawfully entitled to briefly detain [the 
accused] for investigative purposes. When his 
questioning and other observations revealed [the 
accused’s] condition, [the officer] had proper 
grounds to make the roadside screening  demand 
and then, given the fail reading, the breathalyzer 
demand. All of this means that [the accused’s] 
detention was not arbitrary.
 
Since there  was no s. 9 breach, a s. 24(2)  analysis 
was unnecessary. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed and the order for a new trial was upheld.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BY THE BOOK:
Saskatchewan’s	 Traffic Safety Act
s. 209.1(1) A peace officer may require the 
person in charge of or operating a motor 
vehicle to stop that vehicle if the peace 
officer:
(a)  is readily identifiable as a peace officer; 
and
(b) is in the lawful execution of his or her duties and 
responsibilities.
(2)  A peace officer may, at any time when a driver is 
stopped pursuant to subsection (1):
(a) require the driver to give his or her name, date of birth 
and address;
(b)  request information from the driver about whether and 
to what extent the driver consumed, before or while driving, 
alcohol or any drug or other substance that causes the driver 
to be unable to safely operate a vehicle; and
(c) if the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the driver has consumed alcohol or a drug or another 
substance that causes the driver to be unable to safely 
operate a vehicle, require the driver to undergo a field 
sobriety test.
(3)  No person in charge of or operating a motor vehicle 
shall, when signalled or requested to stop by a peace officer 
pursuant to subsection (1), fail to immediately bring the 
vehicle to a safe stop.
(4)  No person in charge of or operating a motor vehicle 
shall fail, when requested by a peace officer, to comply with 
the requests of a peace officer pursuant to subsection (2).
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BC	 Law	 Enforcement	 Memorial
Sunday,	 September	 28,	 2014	 at	 1:00	 pm 
Rotary	 Stadium,	 Abbotsford,	 British	 Columbia
Muster	 at	 11:30	 am,	 Thunderbird	 Memorial	 Square,	 Veterans	 Way
NEW	 SUPREME	 COURT	 JUDGE	 ANNOUNCED
On June 12, 2014 the Honourable Mr. Justice Clément Gascon was 
sworn-in as a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada in a private 
ceremony. He had formerly served as a judge of the Quebec Court of 
Appeal. The Supreme Court consists of nine judges with at least three 
of them appointed from the Quebec Court of Appeal, the Superior 
Court of Quebec, or from among Quebec advocates.
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NOTHING	 MORE	 THAN	 ‘WARN’	 
REQUIRED	 FOR	 IMMEDIATE	 
ROADSIDE	 PROHIBITION
Wilson v. British Columbia (Superintendent of 
Motor Vehicles), 
2014 BCCA 202
 
Wilson was stopped in a police road 
check. He had “an odour of liquor on 
his breath” and “admitted to four 
beers hours earlier.” As a  result of an 
ASD demand, he blew a WARN 
reading  (at least 50 mg%). Under s. 215.41 of British 
Columbia’s Motor Vehicle  Act, the officer served 
Wilson with Notice of an immediate roadside 
prohibition (IRP) for a period of three days.
 
Superintendent’s Review
 
Wilson applied to British Columbia’s 
Superintendent of Motor Vehicles for a 
review of the prohibition. He argued the 
officer did not have reasonable  grounds to 
issue the  IRP  because there was no indication that 
his ability  to drive was affected by alcohol. In his 
view, the WARN reading  by itself was insufficient to 
uphold the prohibition. An adjudicator for the 
Superintendent, however, disagreed. In the 
adjudicator’s view, the  WARN reading  constituted 
the reasonable grounds for the officer’s belief that 
Wilson’s ability to drive was affected by alcohol.
 
British Columbia Supreme Court
 
Wilson sought judicial review of the 
adjudicator’s decision. He submitted that 
the legislation outlined in s. 215.41 of 
British Columbia’s Motor Vehicle Act 
requires more than a WARN result from an ASD 
before a driving  prohibition can be issued. In his 
view, the WARN reading  needed to be corroborated 
by other evidence capable of supporting  the officer’s 
reasonable belief that a driver’s ability to drive was 
affected by alcohol.
 
The judge found that the language used in IRP 
legislation did require more than a WARN reading 
before a driving  prohibition could be issued. In the 
judge’s opinion, an officer must have reasonable 
grounds to believe that a driver’s ability to drive is 
affected by alcohol in  addition  to the driver’s breath 
sample having  registered a WARN or FAIL. In other 
words, an IRP could not be issued strictly on the 
basis of a WARN reading  alone. “A plain reading  of 
the legislation requires more than just a WARN 
reading,” said the judge. “There is no presumption 
that a driver's ability to drive is affected by alcohol 
solely on the basis of a  WARN reading.” If the 
legislature intended the WARN reading  to be 
sufficient, the judge found it would have expressly 
said so in the  statute. Since there was no evidence 
that Wilson’s ability to drive was affected by alcohol, 
the notice of prohibition was quashed.
BY THE BOOK:
BC’s	 Motor Vehicle Act: s. 215.41(3.1)
If, at any time or place on a 
highway or industrial road,
(a) a peace officer makes a 
demand to a driver under the 
Criminal Code to provide a 
sample of breath for analysis by means of an 
approved screening device and the approved 
screening device registers a warn or a fail, 
and
(b) the peace officer has reasonable grounds 
to believe, as a result of the analysis, that the 
driver’s ability to drive is affected by alcohol,
the peace officer, or another peace officer, 
must,
(c) if the driver holds a valid licence or 
permit issued under this Act, or a document 
issued in another jurisdiction that allows the 
driver to operate a motor vehicle, take 
possession of the driver’s licence, permit or 
document if the driver has it in his or her 
possession, and
(d) … serve on the driver a notice of driving 
prohibition.
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
 
The Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles then appealed the judicial 
review decision quashing  the 
prohibition. A critical question on 
appeal was whether it was reasonable for the 
adjudicator to find a ‘WARN’ result sufficient to 
provide reasonable grounds to trigger the driving 
prohibition.
 
The Court of Appeal found the adjudicators 
interpretation was reasonable, on the basis of the 
plain language of the  text, the context of the section 
in the statutory scheme, and the purpose and 
objectives of s. 215.41(3.1).
 
Text
 
The officer’s belief that the driver’s ability to drive 
was affected by alcohol follows “as a result of the 
analysis.” Thus, “the result of the analysis is the 
foundation or basis of the peace officer’s belief,” said 
Justice Harris. “The section does not expressly 
require that the peace officer’s belief be based on 
any grounds other than the result of the analysis. 
While the demand to provide a breath sample is 
made under the Criminal Code, the only  stated 
required statutory foundation for the  belief formed 
by the peace officer is the result of the analysis.” He 
continued:
 
On the wording of the section, it seems to me 
that a WARN result can be a sufficient basis 
underlying a peace officer’s reasonable belief 
that a driver’s ability to drive is affected by 
alcohol. It may be that circumstances might arise 
when a peace officer does not have reasonable 
grounds to conclude that, even though the result 
of an analysis is a WARN, a driver’s ability to 
drive has been affected by alcohol. But nothing 
in the wording  of the section requires that a 
peace officer’s belief be based on anything other 
than the result of the analysis. [paras. 25]
 Context
 
This provision “is part of an integrated scheme that is 
intended to facilitate the removal from the road of 
drivers whose ability to drive is affected by alcohol. 
The lynchpin of the system is the use of ASDs often 
in circumstances, such as road blocks, where a 
peace officer has little, if any, opportunity to assess a 
driver’s driving. The focus of the section is on the 
results of the analysis, including  a second analysis 
on a different ASD, if requested. The analysis results 
are the trigger for the issuance of a notice.” There is 
nothing  in the statutory language that requires 
additional evidence  beyond the  result of the 
analysis, whether it be a FAIL or WARN reading. 
Furthermore, there is nothing  in the Superintendent’s 
review procedures that allows for the setting  aside of 
a Notice of Prohibition if the officer’s reasonable 
belief is based only on the analysis result. The 
analysis result is the foundation for the peace 
officer’s reasonable belief.
 
Purpose
 
The purpose and objective  of ARP is to allow for the 
summary removal of drinking  drivers, which is better 
served by relying  on analysis results rather than an 
individualized inquiry by the peace officer to justify 
a reasonable belief. “The administrative regime is 
based on scientific  evidence that drivers with blood 
alcohol levels of .05% and higher are significantly 
more likely to be involved in an accidents,” said 
Justice Harris. “The statute recognizes that not every 
drinking  driver is ‘impaired’, but the purpose of the 
statutory scheme includes removing  drivers from the 
road who may pose a risk of causing  injury by 
employing  a common standard, regardless of a 
particular individual’s tolerance for alcohol.” He 
continued:
 
In summary, the purpose behind the ARP regime 
is to reduce the number of deaths and injuries 
resulting  from alcohol-related crashes by getting 
drinking  drivers off the roads. To achieve this 
goal, the Province has established an 
administrative regime, which is triggered when a 
driver’s breath sample registers a WARN or a 
FAIL on an ASD. The adjudicator’s interpretation 
of the section is reasonable because it furthers 
that purpose.
“[I]t seems to me that a WARN result can 
be a sufficient basis underlying a peace 
officer’s reasonable belief that a driver’s 
ability to drive is affected by alcohol.”
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The prohibition follows “the happening of an 
event”; not the happening of an event and 
something more supporting a reasonable belief. 
… [para. 36-37] 
The adjudicator’s interpretation of s. 215.41(3.1)  was 
reasonable. Nothing  more than a WARN was 
required for the officer to conclude that a  driver’s 
ability to drive was affected by alcohol.
 
The Superintendent’s appeal was allowed and the 
prohibition was reinstated.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
WITNESS	 REPORT	 OF	 IMPAIRED	 
DRIVING	 DID	 NOT	 ALTER	 s.	 10(b)	 
DELAY
R. v. Ackerman, 2014 NLCA 26
A citizen was concerned another 
driver may be impaired after seeing  a 
vehicle swerving  and being  driven 
“all over the road”.  He called the 
police and reported its licence plate 
number, a general description and said it had turned 
into an industrial park.  A police officer was 
immediately dispatched and was told that the 
vehicle was registered to the accused.  The officer 
located the  vehicle in a parking  lot. The accused 
came out of a building  to speak with the officer as a 
result of a  message the officer had sent via another 
worker. When questioned, he identified his vehicle 
and told the officer that he had parked it there. The 
officer noted an odour of alcohol on the accused’s 
breath and that his speech was slurred.   The officer 
then made a demand under 254(2)  of the Criminal 
Code  for the accused to provide a breath sample 
into an approved screening  device.  He complied 
and registered a FAIL. He was then arrested, advised 
him of his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the 
Charter, and brought to the detachment for 
breathalyzer testing.  
Newfoundland Provincial Court
The judge rejected the accused’s evidence 
that he  had left his vehicle in the parking 
lot overnight and that his fiancé had 
driven him to work. In the judge’s 
opinion, the only rational inference from the 
evidence was that the accused drove the vehicle to 
work in the morning, which resulted in the citizen 
calling  police. The judge also ruled that the 
accused’s s. 10(b) right to counsel had not been 
breached when the officer did not immediately 
advise the accused of his right to counsel but waited 
until he was arrested. He was convicted of operating 
a motor vehicle while over 80 mg%.
CIRCUMSTANCES ESTABLISH 
CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION 
 The Ontario  Court  of Appeal has 
concluded that  a trial judge did not 
err in finding An Bai Zheng in 
constructive possession and 
control of the house and its 
contents, which included 343 
marihuana plants in the basement. The 
police had responded to  a 911 call 
about gunshots heard at a house. 
When police searched the three 
bedroom home to  see if anyone 
was injured they found the large 
marihuana grow  operation. Only 
one bedroom was being used as 
a b e d r o o m . T h e s e c o n d 
bedroom was covered in black 
garbage bags, had large lights, 
dirt and wires in it. The third bedroom had 200 
stacked and empty  flower pots, and soil on the 
floor. Zheng’s passport, citizenship and a signed 
power of attorney were found on a coffee table. 
Zheng’s conviction for possessing marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking was upheld. “[Zheng] 
was the sole occupant of a house in which a very 
large marihuana grow operation was discovered - 
spread through the entire house,” said Justice Blair. 
“Another judge may have come to a different 
conclusion, but it was open to the trial judge here, 
on the record before her, to find that the [accused] 
was in control and possession of the premises and 
had knowledge of the operation and, therefore, 
was in constructive possession of the marijuana 
plants.” - R. v. Zheng, 2014 ONCA 345 
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Newfoundland Supreme Court
The accused argued, among  other things, 
that the trial judge erred in not finding  a 
s. 10(b) breach. The appeal judge ruled 
that there was a reasonable limit, 
prescribed by law under s. 1 which did not require 
the police  to immediately advise the accused of his 
right to counsel upon contact. Since the trial judge 
had properly determined that the right to counsel 
was provided at the appropriate time, the accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal recognized 
that these facts were slightly 
dif ferent from other typical 
impaired cases because the 
accused was not pulled over while  driving. In 
typical impaired driving  cases, where a police 
officer stops a vehicle under provincial legislation, 
the s. 10(b)  requirements can be satisfied at the time 
of arrest, as opposed to the time of the initial pull 
over. In this case, however, the accused was not 
pulled over while driving. The  vehicle had been 
parked and it was someone other than the police 
officer who saw the vehicle being driven.
Justice Welsh, for the unanimous 
Court of Appeal, concluded that 
the accused was detained for 
the purposes of s. 10(b) when 
the officer began to ask him 
questions related to driving  his 
vehicle. When the detention 
started he was not provided his 
right to counsel and therefore 
his s. 10(b)  right was infringed. 
This infringement, however, was 
prescribed by law and justified under s. 1 of the 
Charter:
1. The police were  acting  under the statutory 
scheme of the Criminal Code provisions which 
authorize them to investigate suspected 
impaired drivers. “Section 254 provides 
authority  for a police officer to conduct 
specified sobriety  tests and to make a demand 
for breath samples for purposes of an approved 
screening  device  and a Breathalyzer,” said 
Justice Welsh.
2. The delay (limit)  in advising  the accused of his 
s. 10(b) right to counsel was “implied from the 
operating  requirements” of s. 254 and was for 
the purpose of roadside screening.  The ASD 
result was used solely for the police officer in 
fo rming  h i s g rounds for making  the 
breathalyzer demand. The accused was given 
the opportunity to exercise his s. 10(b) right 
upon arrest (after the screening  process)  but 
before being  requested to provide incriminating 
evidence through breath samples.   
As for the officer not observing  the accused driving, 
it didn’t matter in determining  whether s. 10(b) had 
been breached. Justice Welsh stated:
… The fact that the erratic driving, together with 
information to identify the vehicle, was provided 
by a concerned citizen has no effect on the 
analysis.  It is clearly within the authority of the 
police to investigate potential offences reported 
by members of the public.
  
In this case, the police officer was undoubtedly 
acting within the lawful execution of her duties 
and responsibilities when she pursued an 
investigation into a suspected impaired driver 
based on the information supplied just 
m inu te s ea r l i e r by a conce rned 
citizen.  Significant detail was provided 
including the basis for the observer’s 
concerns, the licence plate number and a 
description of the vehicle, and information 
that the vehicle had turned into a 
commercial parking lot. The officer arrived 
at the scene within about ten minutes and 
immed ia t e l y l oca t ed t he pa rked 
vehicle.  By that time she had already 
obtained the name of the registered owner of the 
vehicle and, without delay, took steps to locate 
him.  The officer asked [the accused] if he had 
parked the car in the lot, to which he responded 
yes. He did not qualify his response by saying he 
had not driven the vehicle since the previous 
day having  left it overnight in the parking lot. He 
gave no indication that he had not just been 
driving  the vehicle, or that someone else had 
been dr iv ing i t , wi th or wi thout h i s 
permission.  The officer noticed the odour of 
alcohol on [the accused’s]breath and that his 
“[T]the police officer 
was entitled to proceed 
on the basis of the 
information she had at 
the time of her 
investigation.”
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speech was slurred. While [the accused] testified 
at trial that he had not been driving  the vehicle 
at the relevant time, the police officer was 
entitled to proceed on the basis of the 
information she had at the time of her 
investigation.
 
The officer formed the opinion, based on the 
collected information, that she had sufficient 
grounds for making  a demand, pursuant to 
section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, requiring 
[the accused] to provide breath samples on an 
approved screening device.  He registered a 
“fail”.  At that point the officer arrested [the 
accused], charged him with the impaired driving 
offence and advised him of his section 10(b) 
right to counsel. [paras. 29-31]
 
Although the accused’s right to counsel under 
section 10(b) was infringed when he was initially 
detained, the  infringement was justified under 
section 1 “given the nature of the offence, the 
circumstances surrounding  the police officer’s 
investigation, and the officer’s action in advising  [the 
accused] of his right to counsel upon his arrest at the 
conclusion of the investigation phase.” The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed and his conviction was 
upheld.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
 
ACCUSED	 MUST	 PROVE	 RIGHTS	 
BREACHED	 UNDER	 s.	 10(b)	 
CHARTER	 
R. v. Edmonton, 2014 ABCA 186
 
The accused was arrested for 
impaired driving  and given advice 
about his right to counsel. He spent 
from 11:13 pm to 11:20 pm in a 
phone room where he attempted to 
reach a toll free number but was told he should call 
back in 10 minutes. At 11:20 pm the officer told the 
accused, “It’s up to you, you can keep  trying, there 
are lots of numbers”. The accused tried a second 
number and by 11:26 pm had redialed the number 
on the wall. He held the phone to his ear and, at 
11:30 pm, hung  up, but dialed again at 11:31 pm. 
The officer saw the accused with the phone to his 
ear and apparently speaking. At 11:41 pm the 
accused came to the phone room door and told the 
officer that he was done. This statement to the officer 
was consistent with the officer having  earlier told the 
accused to tell him when he was finished. There was 
no further conversation about counsel and the 
accused provided two breath samples over 80 mg% 
at 11:48 pm and 12:08 am.
Alberta Provincial Court
The judge found the accused’s s. 10(b) 
Charter rights had been breached. In his 
view, the implementational aspect of the 
right to counsel had not been met. The 
accused had been told to call back in 10 minutes 
and the police failed to provide him with a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise his right to 
counsel. The judge held the officer was required 
under the circumstances to question the accused 
and re-advise him of his right to counsel. The 
evidence of the breathalyzer readings was excluded 
and the accused was acquitted of over 80 mg%. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The appeal court upheld the acquittal, 
finding  the trial judge did not err in 
holding  that the officer should not have 
assumed that the accused had made all 
the calls he wanted to when he said was done on 
the phone. Therefore, he  had not exercised his right 
to consult with counsel. The appeal judge 
speculated that the accused may have spoken to a 
law student or some other inadequate advisor on the 
phone. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
A further Crown appeal was 
successful. Justice Watson, speaking 
for the Court of Appeal, concluded 
that the accused had failed in his 
burden of proving  that his rights under s. 10(b) had 
been breached. In this case, the police were  entitled 
to act on what the accused told them. He said he 
was done. The officer assisting  the accused was not 
required to make enquiries or be satisfied that the 
accused had actually had a sufficient conversation 
with a lawyer. The Crown’s appeal was allowed and 
a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
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BCLEDN
BC Law En forcement D ivers i t y Net work
Nov. 5th, 2014 from 9am to 4pm @ The Justice Institute of BC
Registration from 8am to 8:45am • Pre-register at www.bcledn.org 
$175 (before or on Sept 30) and $225 (after September 30)
Attendance Restricted to Law Enforcement Personnel Only
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Dr. Martin Bouchard
Associate Professor of 
Criminology & Director of 
the International Cyber 
Crime Research Centre 
(SFU) and Associate 
Director of Research of 
TSAS. Bouchard will present 
on the role of social 
networks connected to 
illegal markets, organized 
crime & more specifically, 
terrorism.
Dr. Lorne L. Dawson
Chair of the Department 
of Sociology and Legal 
Studies at the University 
of Waterloo and Professor 
in the Department of 
Sociology and Legal 
Studies and Department 
of Religious Studies. 
Dawson will discuss the 
process of radicalization 
in homegrown terrorists 
groups. 
Mubin Shaikh
Coming from a 
background of having 
been a Muslim extremist in 
earlier years to becoming 
an undercover operative 
in several high profile 
classified cases. Shaikh 
will provide an extremely 
unique perspective 
on radicalization and 
recruitment as it relates to 
society today.
Insp. Steve Corcoran  
Operations Officer for 
the E Division National 
Security Enforcement 
Team (INSET) and active 
member of the National 
Security Program for 
over 11 years. Corcoran 
brings a local and 
front-line perspective on 
homegrown terrorism and 
radicalization.
The BC LEDN is a sub-committee of the British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police with representation from the following participating agencies.
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INFERRED	 JOINT	 POSSESSION	 
JUSTIFIES	 ARREST	 &	 SEARCH
R. v. De Guzman, 2014 ABCA 201
 
After a police officer passed a car in 
a marked police vehicle, the car 
suddenly braked and slowed from 
115 kmh to 97 kmh. The officer 
thought this was “atypical” in a 110 
kmh zone. Because of the slow speed, other vehicles 
had to manoeuvre around it. The officer then pulled 
the accused over to check for fitness and sobriety. 
The accused initially  lowered his car window 
halfway down. The officer asked him to lower it fully 
and requested licence, registration and insurance 
information. The passenger began answering 
questions the officer posed to the accused. The 
passenger was exhibiting  signs of extreme 
nervousness, bouncing  his leg  and moving  his hand 
to his waist as if checking for a weapon.
The officer commented to the passenger about his 
nervousness and, at the  same time, became 
suspicious and concerned for his safety. He asked 
the passenger for identification. When the passenger 
pulled his hand out of his right pocket, the officer 
saw a “dime bag” - a  small bag  marked with a 
marijuana leaf . The officer considered the bag  was 
consistent with those used to hold illicit substances. 
When the  officer asked the passenger to show him 
the contents of his pockets, he tried to hide  the bag, 
dropping  it on the  floor near the accused. Both men 
were arrested for possession of a controlled 
substance. The accused was patted down and a 
package containing  methamphetamine was found 
on him. A bag  of methamphetamine was also 
located in the  vehicle along  with other drug 
paraphernalia, including a scale.  
Alberta Provincial Court
The judge found the accused and his 
passenger had been detained, but the 
detention was not arbitrary and the search 
was reasonable. He ruled that the 
detention was a result of a traffic stop for a driving-
related purpose and was intended to be brief. He 
also found that the request for the passenger’s 
‘FASD’ DID NOT PREVENT ACCUSED 
FROM FORESEEING 
CONSEQUENCES OF STABBING
 After Dakota Manitowabi was 
convicted of second degree 
murder for stabbing a man, he 
was sentenced as an adult, 
given life imprisonment and 
ordered to  serve his time in a 
f e d e r a l p e n i t e n t i a r y . H e  t h e n 
appealed to  Ontario’s top court, 
arguing that he  suffered from Fetal 
Alcohol Spectrum  Disorder (FASD) at 
the t ime of the murder which 
impaired his ability  to foresee the 
consequences of his actions; 
s tabb ing the v ic t im in the 
abdomen would be fatal. 
“ F A S D i s a p e r m a n e n t n e u r o -
developmental disorder. It is an umbrella 
term describing a range of effects that can 
occur in an individual whose mother drank alcohol during 
pregnancy.  Those effects can include physical, mental, 
behavioural and learning disabilities.  Fetal Alcohol Syndrome 
(“FAS”) describes the most severe manifestations of the 
disorder. ... FASD impacts on executive functioning. Executive 
functioning engages the more abstract forms of thinking, 
including the ability to maintain an appropriate problem-solving 
set for the attainment of goals.  Executive functioning refers to 
specific cognitive skills, including planning and mental 
representation.  An individual with an executive functioning 
deficit may display poor organizational skills and planning, a lack 
of concrete thinking and inhibition, difficulty grasping cause and 
effect, and an inability to delay gratification. FASD in a particular 
individual may affect some but not other forms of executive 
functioning.” [paras. 40-41]
The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected his 
submission. Although the expert  evidence 
established that Manitowabi suffered from FASD 
and it  was relevant to  the state of mind inquiry, the 
evidence failed to  establish that his FASD had an 
e f f e c t  o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e p r o b a b l e 
consequences of stabbing the victim. “Evidence 
that FASD can, in some people, on some 
occasions, affect some forms of executive 
functioning, including appreciation of cause and 
effect relationships, could not materially advance 
the defence claim that the Crown had failed to 
prove that [Manitowabi] foresaw [the victim’s] 
death as a likely result of the stabbing,” said 
Justice Doherty. - R. v. Manitowabi, 2014 ONCA 301
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identification was permitted under Alberta’s Traffic 
Safety Act. Further, the judge ruled that when the 
passenger produced a bag  containing  drugs, the 
officer had reasonable and probable grounds to 
arrest the passenger. The officer also drew a 
reasonable inference that the driver was in joint 
possession - he had knowledge, possession and 
control of things within his vehicle; and therefore his 
arrest was lawful. The searches of the accused and 
his vehicle  were incidental to arrest and reasonable. 
There were no ss. 8  or 9 Charter  breaches and a 
conviction for possessing  methamphetamine for the 
purpose of trafficking was entered. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
conviction arguing, among  other 
grounds, that the trial judge  erred 
in finding  his rights under ss. 8  and 
9 of the Charter were not violated. In his view, the 
evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2). 
Detention
The accused submitted that his s. 9 Charter rights 
were violated when the vehicle was arbitrarily 
stopped, his passenger detained during  the demand 
for identification, and the detention continued 
beyond a traffic stop. 
The Crown conceded that both occupants were 
detained. However, the Court of Appeal found the 
detention was not arbitrary. The accused, as driver, 
was lawfully detained for the purpose of the Traffic 
Safety Act which flowed from his driving  pattern. 
Further, the passenger’s detention, if arbitrary, did 
not result in breach of the accused’s s. 9 rights. 
“In our view, whether the  passenger’s rights (in this 
case  the co-accused)  had been violated is somewhat 
beside the point,” said the Court of Appeal. “Charter 
rights are personal.” Whether a detention is lawful 
must be based on the circumstances regarding  the 
accused, not the rights or circumstances of his 
passenger. The Court of Appeal stated:
In this case, it was the passenger’s behaviour that 
raised a reasonable suspicion in the mind of the 
police officer. The passenger was providing 
answers on behalf of the [accused], he was 
extremely nervous, he kept reaching for 
something in his pocket, and his overall 
behaviour caused the constable concern for his 
own safety. The constable asked that the 
passenger identify himself so that he could run 
his name through CPIC to gather further 
information regarding this possible threat.
It was only in the process of producing his 
identification that the passenger either 
coincidentally or accidentally displayed the 
bag. [paras. 21-22]
Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court of 
Appeal concluded the accused was not unlawfully 
detained. 
Search
The accused argued that his s. 8 Charter rights were 
also breached when the officer demanded his 
passenger produce identification and show the 
contents of his pockets. He further contended that 
the search of his person and vehicle were also 
unreasonable.
Again, any breach of the passenger’s s. 8  rights did 
not necessarily amount to a breach of the accused’s 
rights. Further, the discovery of the passenger’s 
“dime bag" supported reasonable grounds for the 
arrest and search of the accused:
Once the “dime bag” was produced, the 
constable was lawfully entitled to arrest the 
passenger for possession: section 495(1)(b) of the 
Criminal Code.
The constable testified and the trial judge 
accepted that once the drugs were produced, the 
constable drew a reasonable inference that 
possession of the drugs was joint. Specifically, 
the trial judge noted the driving pattern of the 
[accused], the half-open window, and that the 
passenger’s method of trying  to get rid of the 
drugs implicated the [accused]. He found on 
these facts that the constable had reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest the [accused] based 
on his joint possession of an illicit substance. 
This conclusion was available on the evidence 
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and we see no basis in law to interfere. The 
search of the [accused] and his vehicle were 
conducted incidental to a lawful arrest. [paras. 
24-25]
The evidence was properly admitted and the 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
WARRANTLESS	 FULL	 
DOWNLOAD	 OF	 SMARTPHONE	 
UNREASONABLE	 
R. v. Mann, 2014 BCCA 231
During  a kidnapping  investigation, 
the accused was arrested and a 
Blackberry seized from him. He was 
released without charge but re-
arrested 20 days later once he was 
charged with the kidnapping. On this arrest, a 
second BlackBerry device was seized from him. The 
BlackBerry  seized from the first arrest was submitted 
for analysis to the RCMP’s Technological Crime Unit 
in Ottawa but could not be analyzed because it was 
password protected. It was resubmitted two years 
later and the user data extracted included 72 text 
messages the Crown used as evidence. The 
BlackBerry  seized from the second arrest was also 
submitted for analysis about a week after that arrest 
and was analyzed some three weeks later resulting 
in the recovery of 269 text messages. No search 
warrant was sought or obtained with respect to the 
searches of the BlackBerry devices.
 
British Columbia Supreme Court
       
The accused submitted, among  other 
arguments, that the warrantless searches 
of the contents of the BlackBerry devices 
were not authorized under the common 
law power of a search incident to arrest. In his view, 
searches as an incident to arrest do not extend to 
the “highly intrusive” search of a mobile 
communication devices that can store private 
information, such as the BlackBerrys in this case.
The judge found the warrantless searches were 
lawful as an incident to the arrests. He relied on 
case law that held such a   search did not fall outside 
the scope of the common law power. The searches 
were reasonable, authorized by the common law 
power to search incident to arrest, and no warrants 
were required to search the BlackBerrys’ contents. 
There were no s. 8 Charter breaches and therefore s. 
24(2) was not triggered. The accused was convicted 
of several charges related to the kidnapping.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
Although he conceded that a 
cursory search of a  smartphone 
incident to arrest for a valid 
purpose related to arrest did not 
breach s. 8, the accused argued that the case law 
has evolved such that a detailed search of a 
smartphone type device now required a warrant. The 
Crown, on the  other hand, submitted that the 
BlackBerry  searches were reasonable as authorized 
by the common law as searches incident to arrest. 
Search Incident to Arrest
Justice Levine, writing  the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, first examined the power of search under 
the common law as an incident to arrest. She noted 
the following points:
• s. 8 of the Charter protects an individuals 
privacy from unjustified state intrusion.
• The onus is on the  Crown to show that the 
state’s interest in law enforcement outweighs 
the individual’s privacy interest. This generally 
requires prior authorization (eg. warrant).
• Warrrantless searches are presumed to be 
unreasonable.
• Where a search is carried out without a 
warrant, the Crown has the burden of showing, 
on a balance of probabilities, that the search 
was reasonable. A warrantless search will be 
reasonable if it is authorized by law, if the law 
itself is reasonable, and the manner in which 
the search was carried out is reasonable.
• The warrantless power of search incident to 
arrest is a  well-established exception to the 
requirement for prior judicial authorization for 
a valid search. 
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• There are two justifications for the power to 
search incident to arrest. 
1. To ensure the arrested person will come 
before the court. A search for weapons or 
other dangerous articles precludes the 
possibility of their use against police, the 
public or the accused themselves. 
2. The process of arrest must ensure that 
evidence found on the accused and the 
immediate surroundings is preserved.
• There are limits on the power to search incident 
to arrest in cases where the privacy interest of 
an individual is heightened (eg. the seizure of 
samples of bodily substances, strip searches).
Smartphones
Since this case, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
recognized the highly invasive nature of cell phone 
searches and computers based on the quantity and 
quality of information the devices can contain. 
Justice Levine concluded that “the law as it stands 
today no longer permits police to conduct 
warrantless searches of the entire contents of an 
individual’s cell phone.” The warrantless searches of 
the BlackBerrys breached the accused’s s. 8  Charter 
rights: 
It seems to me that downloading the entire 
contents of a cell phone or smartphone, like the 
BlackBerrys in this case, seized on the arrest of 
the accused, after some delay, without a search 
warrant, can no longer be considered valid 
under s.8  of the Charter as a reasonable 
warrantless search. The highly invasive nature of 
these searches exceeds the permissible scope for 
a warrantless search authorized under the 
common law as a search incident to arrest.
The interest of the state in law enforcement does 
not justify such a warrantless search. In this case, 
the searches were carried out more than two 
years after the [accused’s] arrests. The delay itself 
demonstrates that none of the purposes that 
justify a warrantless search incident to arrest 
were relevant. Obtaining  a warrant could not 
have interfered with preserving the evidence or 
with officer safety. In fact, there is no 
explanation for not obtaining  a warrant except 
that the nature of the object searched had 
previously been likened to other objects – 
logbooks, diaries, notebooks – that had not been 
considered to give rise to a serious invasion of 
the accused’s right to privacy.
It now seems obvious that the individual’s 
privacy interest in the contents of a device such 
as a BlackBerry outweighs the state’s interest in 
law enforcement, and a warrantless search of 
those contents is unreasonable according to the 
test set out in Collins. [paras. 118-120]
Admissibility - s. 24(2)
Despite the s. 8  breach, the  evidence  was not 
excluded under s. 24(2)  as its admission would not 
bring  the administration of justice into disrepute. The 
breach was not serious; the police acted on the law 
as it stood at the time. Although the accused’s 
privacy interest in the information contained in the 
BlackBerrys was considered high, the actual 
information retrieved did not include such highly 
private material such as photos, videos, or even 
music. The information obtained consisted of 
messages and contacts and were discoverable had 
the police  obtained a search warrant. Finally,  the 
evidence obtained from the BlackBerrys was highly 
reliable  and relevant, and existed independently of 
any Charter breach. Its exclusion would negatively 
impact the truth-seeking  function of the criminal trial 
process. The seriousness of the offence of 
kidnapping also favoured admission.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Editor’s note:  The British Columbia Civil Liberties 
Association appeared as an Intervenor in this case. It 
not only supported the accused’s submission on the 
warrant requirement for the smartphone but went 
farther to suggest that the common law did not 
authorize a cursory search of a smartphone incident 
to arrest. The British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
however, felt it unnecessary to address this 
argument.
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NO	 INFORMER	 PRIVILEGE	 OVER	 
EMAIL:	 NO	 EXPRESS	 or	 IMPLIED	 
PROTECTION	 OFFERED
R. v. Cook, 2014 ONCA 170
The accused, a  police officer, was 
convicted of attempting  to possess 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, 
breach of trust by an official, 
possession of stolen property and 
simple  possession of marijuana. He intercepted a 
controlled delivery of fake cocaine packaged in the 
shape of bricks, each weighing  one kilogram.  He 
had 15 bricks in the trunk of his police cruiser and 
took them home. Tracking  devices installed in the 
bricks led police to locate them inside his 
garage.  Police also found 443  grams of marijuana 
and stolen property. His defence was that he did not 
know the bricks were cocaine and that he took them 
home on the orders of his supervising officers.
After he was sentenced and launched a conviction 
appeal, the police received an anonymous email 
alleging  misconduct by the accused’s supervising 
officers that dated back  decades. The Internal Affairs 
Bureau investigated the email, identified its author 
and disclosed the results of the investigation in 
redacted form to the accused’s counsel. On request 
Some	 Cases	 Referred	 to	 by	 BCCA	 in	 R.	 v.	 Mann
R. v. Polius, [2009] O.J. No. 3074: Police seized a cell 
phone on arrest for counselling murder, searched it to find its 
number, and used that information to obtain a production order 
under s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code to acquire his cell phone 
records. The judge found the arresting officer did not have a 
reasonable basis to believe that the cell phone may contain 
evidence of the alleged offence. In addition, the judge opined 
that a search warrant was required to search it beyond a cursory 
examination. 
R. v. Manley, 2011 ONCA 128: Police seized a cell phone 
on arrest for two robberies. The police opened the cell phone to 
search for evidence of ownership and found a photograph of the 
accused holding a sawed off shotgun, taken the day after one of 
the robberies. The photograph was copied and printed. The 
police subsequently obtained a warrant to search the contents of 
the phone. The warrantless cursory search of the cell phone to 
determine ownership was lawful as the police had information 
that the accused had stolen cell phones in the past and because 
ownership of the cell phone was relevant to the offences for 
which he had been arrested.  
R. v. Fearon, 2013 ONCA 106: Police seized a cell phone 
on arrest for armed robbery. The arresting officer examined the 
contents of the cell phone (which was not password protected) 
and found incriminating photographs and a text message. The 
cell phone was searched further during the night and the next 
morning as the investigation continued, but no more evidence 
was found. Months later, the police obtained a search warrant 
to search the phone again. The cursory search of the cell phone 
immediately following the arrest was a lawful search incident to 
arrest as was the examination of the cell phone’s contents at the 
police station because they too were connected to the search at 
the scene of the arrest. This decision is under appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada.
R. v. Hiscoe, 2013 NSCA 48: The police read the text 
messages on a cell phone on arrest for possession of cocaine, 
and re-read the messages later that day. One month later, police 
had all the contents of the phone downloaded onto a DVD by the 
Technological Crime Unit. The police were authorized to 
conduct a cursory review of the text messages upon arrest and 
later that day, but the full content download or “data dump” 
was beyond the scope of a search incident to arrest. The month 
delay between the seizure of the phone and the full data 
retrieval also reduced any connection with the arrest. The 
evidence obtained through the data dump, except for the text 
messages twice retrieved on the day of arrest, was excluded 
under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
R. v. Vye, 2014 BCSC 93: Police searched an “iPhone 4” 
three times without a warrant, removing it from the accused’s 
pocket, doing a cursory search of the device the same day, and 
conducting a software-aided forensic examination nearly one 
year later. The accused did not contest the validity of the first 
two searches, but the judge found the software-aided forensic 
search breached the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights because the 
search was beyond the power of search incident to arrest.  
R. v. Morelli 2010 SCC 8; R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60: 
These two Supreme Court of Canada cases did not deal with a 
search incident to arrest but underscored the heightened privacy 
interests individuals have in the contents of computers and cell 
phones. 
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for the email author’s identity, the Crown refused to 
disclose it by asserting informer privilege.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused sought disclosure of 
the emai l author ’s ident i ty, 
submitting  it was not privileged 
and could assist with a fresh 
evidence application on appeal. The Crown, to the 
contrary, suggested the author’s identity was 
protected by privilege and therefore the  accused 
needed to engage the “innocence at stake” 
exception.
Justice Benotto, speaking  on behalf of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, concluded that the identity of the 
email author was not protected by either 
confidential informer or public  interest privilege.  
Here, “there was no conduct on the part of the 
police, express or implied, that could have led the 
author to believe that his or her identity would be 
protected,” said Justice  Benotto. “The police merely 
received an unsolicited anonymous email.”  Nor was 
it similar to a  “crime stoppers” communication 
which is founded on a promise of anonymity.
Further, public interest privilege did not apply either:
Public interest privilege involves a claim by a 
government or an official that certain 
information should be kept secret.  Typical 
situations involve the need to keep police 
investigative techniques confidential or the 
protection and safety of individuals. The Crown 
has the burden of establishing the need to keep 
the identity of the author secret. The Crown 
attempted to satisfy this burden by alleging  that 
the author’s mental health issues, fear of police 
and fear of retribution engage public interest 
privilege.  However, there is no objective 
evidence underlying  the author’s fears.  On the 
record before us, the Crown’s burden has not 
been met. [para. 19]
The Crown ‘s claim for privilege over the redacted 
information was rejected. The accused’s application 
was allowed and the Crown was was directed to 
provide unredacted copies of the documents it had 
already produced, subject to privacy issues identified 
in camera. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
CHARTER	 BREACHES	 MUST	 BE	 
CONNECTED	 TO	 DISCOVERY	 OF	 
EVIDENCE
R. v. Andel, 2014 BCCA 179
Police received a report that a cedar 
log  outhouse had been stolen and 
received a tip that a white Dodge 
pickup truck had been seen in the 
area around the time of the theft. A 
few weeks later a  police officer received photos of 
the stolen outhouse in a new location on a large 
rural property. Police, without a warrant, attended at 
the 30+ acre apple orchard to investigate. The 
property had numerous outbuildings and barns 
POSITION AS POLICE OFFICER 
AGGRAVATING FACTOR IN 
SENTENCING
 The Ontario Court of Appeal has 
upheld the conviction and five year 
sentence of a police off icer 
c o n v i c t e d o f a r s o n a n d 
a d m i n i s t e r i n g a n o x i o u s 
substance. The accused, Cecile 
Fournel, was a detective with the 
Ontario  Provincial Police. The Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice found Fournel 
had spiked her daughter-in-law’s drink 
with a non-prescription sleep aid, 
put her to bed and then set her 
house on fire. The daughter-in-law 
was able to escape the fire 
unharmed.
In sentencing Fournel to two years 
for administering a noxious substance 
and three years consecutive  for the arson, the 
judge found her status as a police officer was a 
serious aggravating factor. Fournel appealed her 
sentence arguing it was unduly  harsh and 
excessive. However, the Ontario  Court of Appeal 
upheld the five  year sentence as fit. “[The 
accused’s] position as a  police officer, and the 
violation of the community expectation she would 
obey the law”  was properly  considered as an 
aggravating factor. R. v. Fournel, 2014 ONCA 305
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situated on it as well as two rental homes, a trailer 
and a  recreational vehicle. The accused rented the 
recreational vehicle and lived in it. 
Upon entering  onto the property’s driveway, the 
officer noticed a  white 2007 GMC Sierra pickup 
truck driven by the accused pulling  a black  flat-deck 
trailer. When he saw the police, the accused stopped 
the truck, exited it and fled on foot. An officer ran 
toward the truck, shouted for the accused to stop 
and gave chase. When the accused was caught he 
said the officers were on private property and 
initially  refused to answer any questions including 
those about his identity. He was arrested for 
“investigation of” possession of stolen property even 
though the outhouse had not yet been located. He 
was handcuffed and placed in the rear of a police 
vehicle. The police learned the plates on the white 
pickup truck and flat-deck  trailer were inactive. They 
also learned that the  accused had outstanding 
warrants for robbery and theft. The police found the 
outhouse and also searched the area surrounding  the 
accused’s recreational vehicle, finding  more stolen 
property. They also learned the truck and flat-deck 
trailer were  also stolen and he was rearrested for 
possessing  them. During  this time the accused had 
been sitting  in the police vehicle for over 2.5 hours. 
He was taken to the police station where he 
eventually spoke to a lawyer. He was charged with 
22 counts of possessing  stolen property, including 
several vehicles, licence plates, and domestic 
appliances.
British Columbia Provincial Court
At trial the  Crown elected to proceed 
only  on the counts relating  to the stolen 
pickup truck and flat deck trailer. The 
accused then alleged that his arrest and 
detention were arbitrary  under s. 9 of the Charter 
and that his right to consult counsel without delay 
under s.  10(b) had been breached. The judge 
concluded that it was unnecessary to determine 
whether the accused’s ss. 9 and 10 rights had been 
violated. The evidence that the accused was driving 
the stolen pickup truck and trailer when first 
encountered by the  officer was unconnected 
causally, temporally, or contextually to the alleged 
ss. 9 and 10 infringements. Since the discovery of 
the stolen truck and trailer did not result from the 
accused’s arrest or detention, no exclusion under s. 
24(2) was possible. He was convicted on two counts 
of possession of stolen property over $5,000 related 
to the pickup truck and trailer.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused contended that the 
trial judge erred in finding  that the 
breaches of his Charter rights were 
not connected to the obtaining  of 
the evidence. Justice Groberman, delivering  the 
unanimous Appeal Court decision, disagreed. Even 
assuming  the accused’s arrest was unlawful and that 
his s. 10(b) right had been breached, for s. 24(2) to 
be engaged there must be a sufficient connection 
between the Charter violations and the discovery of 
the evidence. This connection need not be strictly 
causal but a lesser connection may suffice provided 
it is more than remote or tenuous:
In the case before us [the accused] was seen 
operating the truck and towing  the trailer before 
any breaches of ss.  9 or 10(b) occurred. He 
abandoned the pickup truck and the trailer in 
suspicious circumstances, and there was no 
impediment to the police investigating the 
abandoned vehicles. [The accused’s] identity, 
too, was ascertainable, because the plate on the 
stolen vehicle had been previously registered to 
him. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that 
there was any connection between [the 
accused’s] arrest (or the alleged denial of his 
right to counsel) and the police obtaining 
evidence that the truck and trailer were stolen. 
[para. 33.
Here, the trial judge did not rely on speculation in 
finding  that there was no connection between any 
Charter breaches and the discovery of the evidence. 
“[The accused’s] arrest did not have any bearing  on 
the police investigation, either in a formal causal 
sense, or in the sense of influencing  police conduct 
in a way that happened to lead them to the 
impugned evidence,” said Justice Groberman. “In 
my view, the judge made no error in concluding  that 
there  was an absence of any causal, temporal or 
contextual connection between the alleged breaches 
and the impugned evidence.”
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The accused also argued on appeal that his rights 
under s.8 of the Charter were breached when the 
police (1) turned onto the orchard’s driveway and 
first observed him in the pickup  truck and (2) 
attended and searched the area around his 
recreational vehicle. As for the driveway, the Court 
of Appeal found the accused did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy respecting  it. The 
driveway was generally available for use by  he 
public and was in full view of the highway. The 
accused did not rent the driveway, nor was there 
evidence suggesting  he had possession or control of 
it or the right to exclude others from using  it. The 
police did not violate the accused’s rights simply by 
entering  onto the property. Further, while  it was 
likely the warrantless search of the area around the 
accused’s recreational vehicle breached his s. 8 
rights, this did not taint the police investigation 
regarding  the charges related to the truck and trailer. 
The accused failed to raise the s. 8  issue at trial and 
no critical findings of fact about whether there was a 
sufficient connection to the evidence were made by 
the trial judge. It was therefore inappropriate for the 
Appeal Court to address this argument.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
ASSAULT	 ARREST	 LAWFUL:
ACCUSED	 OBLIGATED	 TO	 
IDENTIFY	 SELF
R. v. Met, 2014 ABCA 157
A uniformed patrol officer was 
dispatched to a  disturbance on a bus. 
The suspect, who had fled from the 
scene, was described as a white 
male, 5'10", 200 pounds, 40 years 
old, wearing  brown shoes and a black jacket. As the 
officer drove around the area looking  for people 
fitting  the description, he saw the accused standing 
at a bus stop. He was the only individual who 
loosely matched the description. He was a lot bigger 
than the individual described, but the same age, 
wearing  a black jacket and close to where the 
disturbance occurred. 
Wanting  to talk to the accused to determine whether 
he was involved in the disturbance, the officer 
parked his vehicle. As he got out, the accused 
jaywalked across the street with his hands in his 
pockets. Growing  more suspicious, the officer called 
out to the accused, identified himself as a police 
officer, and told him to stop because he needed to 
talk to him. The accused ignored the officer and 
continued to walk away. Another uniformed officer 
arrived, stepped in front of the accused and said, 
“Sir, please, you need to stop” but he walked right 
past. Then, when an officer grabbed the accused’s 
arm to stop  him, he clenched a fist, threw a 
“haymaker” punch, and struck the officer’s right 
shoulder area. The accused was arrested for 
assaulting  a peace officer and refused to identify 
himself, telling  the officer to “Go fuck yourself.” He 
later identified himself to a detective at the police 
station.
CIRCUMSTANCES LEAD TO 
INFERENCE OF FIREARM 
POSSESSION
 The British Columbia Court  of Appeal 
has upheld the conviction of 
Saekwan Lee for the possession of 
two loaded pistols found in a 
plastic bag partially concealed 
under the backseat  of a vehicle in 
which he was the front  seat  passenger. 
The evidence, including five  fingerprints 
on the bag belonging to Lee, its 
location within his arms reach, the 
clumsy attempt to hide the guns, 
and the absence of an innocent 
explanation, led the trial judge to 
conclude that the accused 
exercised control of and had 
knowledge of the  guns. Justice 
Goepel, in a short oral decision, 
f o u n d t h e t r i a l j u d g e d i d n o t 
misapprehend the evidence  nor render an 
unreasonable  judgment. “The evidence is that the 
weapons at issue were found in a bag in a car 
where the [accused] was the passenger,” said 
Justice Goepel. “The bag had a number of the 
[accused’s] fingerprints on it [and he] did not 
testify.” R. v. Lee, 2014 BCCA 164
Volume 14 Issue 3 - May/June 2014
PAGE 33
Alberta Provincial Court
The judge found the officer was not in 
the lawful execution of his duty when he 
placed his hand on the accused’s arm to 
stop  him. He was not under arrest or 
investigative detention at the time and was therefore 
not legally obliged to cooperate with the officer. The 
punch, however, was not a  reasonable response in 
self-defence under the circumstances. It was 
excessive. Although acquitted of assaulting  a peace 
officer in the execution of his duty, the accused was 
convicted of common assault. As for the arrest, there 
were grounds that the accused assaulted the officer 
and therefore the accused was then legally  obligated 
to identify himself. Since he willfully refused to do 
so he was also convicted of obstructing  a peace 
officer in the execution of his duty.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused submitted, among 
other grounds, that the trial judge 
erred in finding  that the officer was 
acting  in the execution of his duties 
after the punch. In his view, the  officer lacked 
reasonable and probable  grounds to arrest him for 
committing  the offence of assaulting  a peace  officer. 
Since the arrest was unlawful, the officer was not 
acting  in the execution of his duties, even after the 
punch. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed. The officer was 
entitled to arrest the accused following the punch:
Since the [accused’s] self-defence argument was 
properly rejected by the trial judge, the fact 
remains that he assaulted [the officer] who was 
then lawfully entitled to arrest the [accused]: s 
495(1)(b) of the Code. The fact that the [accused] 
was found not guilty of assaulting a police 
officer but rather convicted of the lesser and 
included offence of common assault in no way 
derogates from the lawfulness of the arrest. 
Having  effected a lawful arrest, [the officer] was 
entitled to detain the [accused] and to demand 
that he identify himself, which of course the 
[accused] failed to do. [reference omitted, para. 
21]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
  	   ADMISSION	 OF	 DRINKING	 
PROVIDES	 GROUNDS	 FOR	 ASD
R. v. Flight, 2014 ABCA 185
While driving  home from a golf 
course  on a paved rural road, the 
accused accelerated his vehicle, 
fishtailed out of control, crossed the 
centre line, and collided head on 
with another vehicle. It was a warm, sunny day, 
visibility  was good, and the road was bare and dry. 
The accused’s Onstar service  reported the collision 
at 7:32 pm and police were  dispatched to the scene 
at 7:35 pm. The primary investigator arrived at the 
scene at 7:52 pm. The officer spoke with the 
accused, but did not notice anything  unusual about 
his motor skills or speech, nor did he detect any 
odour of alcohol. The officer believed that the 
accused was in shock and told him to go see  EMS 
personnel at the scene.
UTTERING THREATS DOES NOT 
REQUIRE ACTUAL FRIGHT
Manitoba's highest  court has ruled 
that  the offence of uttering threats 
does not require that  the  recipient 
of the threats actual ly  feel 
frightened. The Crown must only 
prove that, objectively, the  words 
(1) threatened death or serious bodily 
harm and (2) that the accused 
intended the words be  taken seriously 
or the recipient feel intimidated by 
them. “The mens rea for uttering 
threats requires that the accused 
intends that the recipient of his 
words feels intimidated by his 
words or that he intended that the 
words be taken seriously,” said 
Justice Beard for the Manitoba 
Court  of Appeal. “It is not necessary 
that the recipient, himself or herself, actually feels 
in t imidated or actual ly takes the words 
seriously. The recipient’s reaction to the accused’s 
words is relevant only to the extent that it assists in 
understanding the accused’s intention in speaking 
the words at issue.” - R. v. Roussin, 2014 MBCA 30
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At 8:25 pm, the officer was advised that the driver of 
the other car died at the scene; its passenger had 
been airlifted to hospital. The officer noticed the 
accused standing  a short distance away with his 
family and asked him to come to his police car so 
more information about the crash could be 
obtained. While  walking, the officer asked the 
accused if he had anything  to drink that day. The 
accused replied, “Yeah, just a couple of drinks at the 
golf course.” The officer formed the belief that 
alcohol may have played a  role in the crash and 
made an approved screening  device (ASD)  demand. 
The ASD registered a FAIL result and the accused 
was arrested for impaired driving  causing  death. He 
was advised of his s. 10(b)  Charter right to counsel, 
read the standard police caution and a breath 
demand was made. At the police detachment he was 
placed in a private phone room where  he remained 
for 37 minutes and made several outgoing  calls. He 
informed the officer that the lawyer he spoke with 
told him to call another lawyer for a second opinion, 
so he was left alone in the phone room for a further 
two minutes. When asked if he was able to reach a 
lawyer, the accused replied, “Didn’t get much 
advice but m-hm.” The accused provided two breath 
samples of 100 mg% and 90 mg% respectively. The 
following day he gave warned statements to police. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge was satisfied that the officer 
had the necessary subjective belief that 
the accused had alcohol in his body for 
an ASD demand under s. 254(2)  of the 
Criminal Code, but she found the belief was not 
objectively reasonable. In the judge’s opinion, the 
accused’s admission of alcohol consumption 
provided little  detail about the quantity  or timing  of 
consumption. This admission, without more, was not 
sufficient to lead a reasonable person to conclude 
that the accused had alcohol in his body. As a result, 
the ASD demand was not properly made. Since the 
Crown conceded that the officer did not have the 
necessary  reasonable and probable  grounds to make 
the breathalyzer demand without the ASD FAIL 
result, the judge found that the accused’s s. 8 
Charter rights had been breached. However, the 
judge admitted the breathalyzer results under s. 24
(2). 
Furthermore, the judge ruled that the police did not 
breach the accused’s s. 10(b) right to counsel. The 
accused had been informed of his s. 10(b) rights and 
was provided a reasonable opportunity to retain and 
instruct legal counsel in private when he arrived at 
the detachment. The officer was entitled to interpret 
the accused’s response, “Didn’t get much advice but 
m-hm” as meaning  he had received legal advice. 
The judge concluded that the accused’s blood 
alcohol concentration impaired his ability to operate 
his vehicle at the time of the collision and his 
impulsive decision to accelerate the vehicle caused 
it. He was convicted of impaired driving  causing 
death and impaired driving causing bodily harm.
 
Alberta Court of Appeal 
The accused challenged his 
convictions, arguing  (in part) that 
the breathalyzer results were 
obtained in violation of his Charter 
rights and that the police denied him adequate 
access to counsel.
Breathalyzer Test Results
The accused challenged the trial judge’s s. 24(2) 
Charter analysis concerning  the admissibility of the 
breathalyzer results. The Crown, on the other hand, 
suggested that the officer had the necessary 
reasonable suspicion to make the  ASD demand 
which provided the necessary reasonable and 
probable grounds to make the  breathalyzer demand. 
Thus, in the Crown’s view, the trial judge erred in 
finding any Charter breaches at all.
A lawful demand under s. 254(3)  requires 
reasonable and probable grounds to make it. In this 
case, the only evidence of reasonable and probable 
grounds for the  breathalyzer demand was the FAIL 
result on the roadside ASD. Thus, the officer needed 
the requisite legal authority to make the  ASD 
demand. 
Justice Veldhuis, delivering  the unanimous Appeal 
Court’s opinion, first examined s. 254 of the Criminal 
Code, finding  it set out a  two stage scheme to 
address the dangers of impaired driving: 
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1. “[Section 254(2)] authorizes a peace officer 
to demand a roadside ASD sample if the 
peace officer has a reasonable suspicion that 
the driver has alcohol  in  his body. An ASD 
will  show a pass, a warning, or a fail result. 
This serves an important investigatory, 
screening function  and permits a peace 
officer to determine whether further, more 
conclusive, testing  is warranted. In normal 
circumstances, a ‘fail’ result from an ASD is 
sufficient to provide a peace officer with the 
requisite reasonable and probable grounds 
to proceed to the second stage.”
2. “[Section 254(3)] authorizes a peace officer 
who has reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that a driver has committed an 
impaired driving offence to demand samples 
for a breathalyzer test. A breathalyzer is a 
more precise instrument. It permits peace 
o f f i ce r s to de te rmine the a l coho l 
concentration in a person’s blood, and 
determine whether the driver’s alcohol  level 
exceeds the limit prescribed by law.  Because 
a breathalyzer test is more intrusive, the 
grounds required to make such a demand 
are higher.”
In this case, the appropriateness of the breathalyzer 
demand depended entirely on whether the officer 
properly made the ASD demand. The reasonable 
suspicion standard for the ASD demand - which 
strikes a balance between an individual’s privacy 
interest and the public interest in enabling  law 
enforcement to investigate crime - has both 
subjective and objective  elements. Reasonable 
grounds is a lower standard than reasonable and 
probable grounds and engages the reasonable 
possibility, rather than probability, of crime. 
The officer subjectively suspected that the accused 
had alcohol in his body at the time of driving. But 
was the accused’s admission that he had “a couple 
of drinks at the golf course,” with no clarification 
about the  quantity  or timing  of consumption, 
sufficient by itself to objectively ground a reasonable 
suspicion that he had alcohol in his body?
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code: s. 254
s. 254(2) If a peace officer has 
reasonable grounds to suspect 
that a person has alcohol or a 
drug in their body and that 
the person has, within the 
preceding three hours, 
operated a motor vehicle or vessel, operated 
or assisted in the operation of an aircraft or 
railway equipment or had the care or control 
of a motor vehicle, a vessel, an aircraft or 
railway equipment, whether it was in motion 
or not, the peace officer may, by demand, 
require the person ...
[...]
(a) to provide forthwith a sample of breath 
that, in the peace officer’s opinion, will 
enable a proper analysis to be made by 
means of an approved screening device and, 
if necessary, to accompany the peace officer 
for that purpose.
s. 254 (3) If a peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a person is 
committing, or at any time within the 
preceding three hours has committed, an 
offence under section 253 as a result of the 
consumption of alcohol, the peace officer 
may, by demand made as soon as practicable, 
require the person
(a) to provide, as soon as practicable,
(i) samples of breath that, in a qualified 
technician’s opinion, will enable a proper 
analysis to be made to determine the 
concentration, if any, of alcohol in the 
person’s blood, or
[...]
(b) if necessary, to accompany the peace 
officer for that purpose.
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The Court of Appeal reviewed two divergent lines of 
authority about whether an admission of alcohol 
alone was sufficient to objectively ground a 
reasonable suspicion under s. 254(2). One line of 
authority found that any admission of drinking 
would suffice while the second line held that a 
driver’s admission that they had something  to drink 
“a while ago” was not enough, absent other indicia. 
Justice Veldhuis went on to conclude the following:
In most cases, the admission of consumption 
alone, without further information about the 
amount and/or timing of consumption, will be 
sufficient to ground an objectively reasonable 
suspicion. Police officers should not be required 
to inquire into alcohol consumption history with 
a driver at the roadside. [para. 50]
And further:
In my view, the wording of section 254(2) 
suggests that the admission of alcohol alone 
will, generally, ground an objectively justifiable, 
reasonable suspicion. That section provides that 
a peace officer can make a roadside ASD 
demand where he “has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a person has alcohol or a drug  in 
their body and that person has, within the 
preceding three hours, operated a motor 
vehicle”. ... [T]he test for reasonable suspicion in 
section 254(2) is based on consumption alone, 
not its amount or effects.
Th i s conc lus ion i s a l so g rounded in 
practicalities. To require peace officers to 
conduct a roadside calculation of likely current 
impairment based on common elimination rates 
is unrealistic and does not reflect the practical 
realities of a roadside stop, nor the two-stage 
scheme that Parliament has established in 
section 254.  Parliament created a framework for 
ready-use in the field. Turning  it into a standard 
difficult to apply would thwart Parliament’s will. 
[reference omitted, paras. 52-53]
In addition, “where a driver is asked whether he has 
had anything  to drink and he responds with 
something  akin to ‘a couple of drinks’ without a 
temporal limitation, it is reasonable to assume that 
the driver is referring  to the present time,” said 
Justice Verdhuis. This applies even where the police 
have arrived at the  scene of a  serious motor vehicle 
accident. “It should be no surprise to anyone that in 
such a situation, an investigating  officer would 
inquire about alcohol consumption. If the inquiry 
had not been made, there may be a suggestion that 
the police did not conduct a thorough investigation. 
The [accused] responded in an unqualified manner 
that he had ‘a couple of drinks.’ In these 
circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that he was 
referring  to alcoholic drinks and that his 
consumption was relatively recent.”
However, each case must be assessed on its own 
facts. Where a driver qualifies an admission of 
consumption temporally, such as stating  they had 
something  to drink “a while ago,” the admission 
alone may not be sufficient to ground a  reasonable 
suspicion. 
... I do not go so far as to suggest that an 
admission of alcohol consumption alone will 
always be enough to meet the reasonable 
suspicion threshold. Again, each case must be 
decided on its own facts and the constellation of 
relevant factors must be examined in their 
totality. The police are entitled (and, indeed, 
required) to react to circumstances as they 
develop. All of the circumstances known to the 
“In most cases, the admission of 
consumption alone, without further 
information about the amount and/or 
timing of consumption, will be sufficient to 
ground an objectively reasonable 
suspicion.”
“[W]here a driver is asked whether he has had anything to drink and he responds with 
something akin to ‘a couple of drinks’ without a temporal limitation, it is reasonable to 
assume that the driver is referring to the present time.”
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officer at the relevant time must be considered 
together, not in isolation.
In summary, I conclude that in most cases, 
admission of consumption alone will be 
sufficient to ground an objectively reasonable 
suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is a low 
standard. Police officers are not required to 
inquire into an alcohol consumption history 
with a driver at the roadside. However, each 
case must be assessed on its own facts. Police 
officers must respond to information as it 
unfolds. [paras. 60-61]
In this case, the  officer had the  requisite reasonable 
suspicion, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
to make the roadside ASD demand. “[He] arrived at 
the scene of a serious car crash on a June evening. 
The roads were dry  and unobstructed. The weather 
was sunny, and visibility  was good. The cars 
appeared to have been involved in a  head-on 
collision. The [accused] was the driver of one of the 
cars. The driver of the other car died in the crash and 
the passenger was badly injured. When [the officer]
asked whether the [accused] had anything  to drink, 
he responded, ‘Yeah, just a couple of drinks at the 
golf course’.” The “fail” result on the ASD then gave 
the officer reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that the  accused had committed an impaired 
driving  offence. The breathalyzer demand was 
therefore properly made and the test results were 
admissible  as evidence without the need for a s. 24
(2)  analysis. There was no s. 8 Charter breach nor 
was the accused arbitrary detained under s. 9 since 
the officer had the necessary reasonable grounds. 
Right to Counsel 
The accused’s argument that the police breached his 
s. 10(b)  right to retain and instruct counsel was 
rejected. He had contended that his response, 
“Didn’t get much advice but m-hm” was ambiguous 
enough that the officer should have  asked clarifying 
questions to get an unequivocal response before 
continuing  the  investigation. The trial judge stated 
the correct legal principles involved and applied 
them properly. She found the accused had received 
legal advice and that the officer was entitled to 
interpret his response as a positive one. The officer 
was not required to further inquire into the quality of 
legal advice the accused had received. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
FACTS, VIEWED CUMULATIVELY, 
PROVIDED GROUNDS FOR ARREST
 The Ontario Court of Appeal has 
rejected a conviction challenge 
by upholding a trial judge’s ruling 
that the police lawfully arrested 
Haytham Meiz at the door to his 
apartment. While the police stood 
at the door they smelled marihuana 
smoke coming from the room when 
they questioned him and saw  drug 
paraphernalia (a weigh scale, white 
powder on the weigh scale, and a 
pill beside the weigh scale) on the 
shelf in the room room. As well, 
Meiz acted suspiciously during 
questioning. “This constellation 
of facts, viewed reasonably and 
cumulatively by someone with 
the experience of the police officer 
in question, provided ample grounds for [the 
accused’s] arrest,” said the Court of Appeal. 
Since the arrest was lawful there was no s. 9 
Charter breach. R. v. Meiz, 2014 ONCA 209
“In summary, I conclude that in most cases, admission of consumption alone will be 
sufficient to ground an objectively reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is a low 
standard. Police officers are not required to inquire into an alcohol consumption history 
with a driver at the roadside. However, each case must be assessed on its own facts. Police 
officers must respond to information as it unfolds.”
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Memorial Ribbon in the background. The 
phrase around the border is etched into 
the Bastion. 
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